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Disarmament Will not Defuse Threat From Capitalist Aggression

18010324 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 4, Feb 88 pp 45-48

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Chernyshev: "Capitalism Without Militarism?"]

[Text] *In a speech dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Great October, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, reflecting on the prospects for the formation of an all-encompassing system of international security under conditions of disarmament, poses difficult questions on which the future of civilization depends. Can capitalism adapt to the conditions of a nuclear-free and disarmed world? In the current phase of world development, at a new level of mutual dependency and the integral nature of the world, is an influence possible on imperialism that would block the most dangerous manifestations of it? Can the range of destructive action of the egocentric and narrow class features of the capitalist system be limited? Can capitalism function and develop economically without militarism?*

It seems to me that a positive answer to these questions is hardly realistic. The nature of imperialism does not change—it was and remains aggressive and militaristic. Moreover, too many forces in the West have a vested interest in the arms race: the monopolies producing the arms, the generals, the state bureaucracy, the ideological apparatus and militarized science, all combined in the powerful military-industrial complex. Or am I incorrect?—N. Plisko (Moscow).

Unfortunately, there are grounds for pessimistic forecasts, and many of them. In recent decades the militarization of capitalist society has increased steadily, and militarism is being turned more and more into a destructive force developing according to its own intrinsic logic and its own intrinsic laws and, moreover, dictating this logic and these laws to mankind. The military-industrial complex has acquired a certain independence in the West, and it has sometimes even come out with some success against the broader and more long-term interests of the ruling class overall.

The situation does not look insoluble nonetheless.

One. Notwithstanding its reactionary nature, adherence to the "policy of force," reliance on military ways of achieving military and political aims and egotistical approach to world politics, imperialism can react to changing objective circumstances. A clear example of this is the coalition between the United States, England and many other capitalist states and the Soviet Union against German fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II.

"Whereas in the past an alliance of socialist and capitalist states was possible in the face of the fascist threat," declared Comrade M.S. Gorbachev in the speech "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," "is there

really any certain lesson that follows from this for the present, when the whole world has come to be faced with the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the necessity of ensuring the security of nuclear power and surmounting the ecological danger? All of these are completely real and terrible things requiring not only an awareness of them, but a search for practical solutions as well."

Another fact is the changing nature of the struggle among the imperialist powers for the economic and political division and partitioning of the world. This struggle is manifested in our time in different forms than it was at the beginning of the century: wars among the leading capitalist states are highly unlikely. The lessons of the last world war and, most important, the fear of weakening oneself before the other social system—socialism—are playing a decisive role herein. The resolution of inter-imperialist contradictions has today been transformed into harsh technological and economic competition.

An awareness is also growing in the West of the fact that capitalism had to pay a high price with major social upheavals for the world wars it unleashed. After the first, revolutionary processes were rapidly developed and the socialist revolution triumphed in Russia. World War II demonstrated even more clearly the crisis of the very institution of war as an instrument of policy. Conceived as a "crusade" against the Soviet state, this war ultimately led to the popular and worldwide historical movement against fascism and its total defeat, while in a number of countries popular-democratic revolutions were successful and the collapse of the colonial empires accelerated.

Second. Antagonism towards socialism doubtless remains one of the defining traits of the policies of imperialism. The fight against the new order has been conditioned first and foremost by the capitalist instinct of self-preservation. Under contemporary conditions, however, when an effort to destroy socialism militarily would inevitably entail the destruction of capitalist society, the self-preservation instinct takes on new substance.

The total force of the munitions exploded during World War II is roughly equal to 2.5 million tons of TNT. The power of the first American atomic bomb that incinerated Hiroshima was 13,000 tons. Today the power of the 50,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the countries on the planet is equivalent to 13 billion tons of TNT. This is 5,200 World War IIs and a million Hiroshimas. Scientists have calculated that just one twentieth of the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers is sufficient to inflict irreparable harm on each other. And taking into account the fires that would arise after the explosions, less than one percent of the accumulated nuclear arms would be required for the "guaranteed annihilation" of any large major country. But this cuts both ways. Anyone who resolves to launch a first strike would doom himself to a tortuous death, and not just from an answering strike, but from the consequences of detonating one's own warheads. The spread of radiation and the impact of "nuclear winter" would completely destroy life on Earth.

Wars fought using conventional weapons are also unacceptable for certain regions. For example, in Europe, highly developed on a technological plane and with a large quantity of nuclear power plants, chemical plants, reserves of petroleum products, buried toxic wastes and the like, even a "conventional" war would be totally destructive and ruinous for every living thing.

This means that if a head-on (or even regional) clash of capitalism and socialism is fraught with catastrophe, the self-preservation instinct should operate against militarism: contemporary war is just as destructive overall for the bourgeoisie as for other classes of society, and it is just as suicidal for capitalism as for socialism. It is for that reason that many leaders of the capitalist world are beginning to realize that super-armament is not identical to security, and already a significant portion of the bourgeoisie is beginning to consider peaceful co-existence as an essential condition for the physical survival of capitalism and its historical fate.

A clash itself with the real possibility of self-destruction cannot help but foster growth in the capitalist countries in intra-political differentiation on issues of war and peace and the arms race. This relates to the ruling circles as well, where there have appeared, and probably will strengthen, realistically thinking forces and, perhaps, the proportionate share of militarist subsegments will decline in the process of devising foreign-policy solutions.

Three. The arms race does not meet the interests of the greater portion of the ruling class today from an economic viewpoint. It is only enriching an inconsiderable and narrow group of monopoly capital. The overwhelming majority of corporations either receive just insignificant crumbs of the military profits or remain outside the "military economy" altogether.

In the United States, for example, the Pentagon's military orders are filled by 20,000 major contractor companies and 100,000 subcontractor firms. There are roughly 14 million firms in the country overall (not including agricultural production). Consequently, less than one percent of the overall number of companies works for the Defense Department. Just a small number of gigantic specialized corporations that comprise the foundation of the military-industrial complex, however, play a leading role among them. Some 65-70 percent of the annual overall value of Pentagon orders has fallen to their share in recent decades, including about 50 percent to the largest and up to 35 percent to the first ten.

Many people have become involved in the military sphere, but not an overwhelming portion of the able-bodied population. Some 2.1 million people were working directly in military industry and one million were employed in various types of services for the military sector in the United States in 1981. Aside from this, three million Americans were in actual military service or were working under voluntary hire. The overall size of the workforce in the United States that year was 110.3

million people. This means that just 5.4 percent of the aggregate workforce of the country was "fed" directly from the militarist "fields." The overwhelming majority of the workers had no objective vested interest in the arms race.

Four. An ever larger portion of the ruling class of the capitalist countries is beginning to realize the negative consequences for itself of militarization—a rise in inflation and budget deficits, reductions in economic growth and the number of jobs, declines in production efficiency etc.

Take, for example, the United States. From 1946 through 1986 inclusive, its total military spending has been 3.4 trillion dollars, and moreover in the six years of the Reagan administration it has reached 1.5 trillion. First and foremost due to this factor, the rate of economic growth in the United States in the 1980s has proven to be somewhat lower (an average of 2.5 percent a year) than in the 1960s (4.3) and even in the 1970s (3.1), earlier felt to be the worst over the whole postwar period. Labor productivity—one of the most important indicators typifying the vitality of economic systems—grew an average of just 0.7 percent in 1980-84 and 0.3 in 1985-86, while, for example, this indicator was 3.2 percent in 1960-64.

The competitiveness of American industrial goods in the international market has declined sharply, and the U.S. trade deficit for 1981-86 was about 600 billion dollars. Distinctive "records" have been set by the Reagan administration in the realm of budget deficits—it jumped from 58.5 billion dollars in 1981 to 221 billion in 1987—as well as the realm of national debt, which has surpassed 2.3 trillion dollars. Whence it is clear how potentially explosive the situation is. The serious disorder of state finances and the whole credit and monetary system overall, strengthening considerably the instability of American capitalism and weakening its international economic positions, is evident.

If such economic policies continue to be brought to life, alarmed American economists warn, by the year 2000 the national debt of the United States will reach 13 trillion dollars, while interest payments on it alone will total 1.5 trillion dollars.

Five. History shows that a capitalist economy can develop without militarization. The minimal military spending in a number of Western states after World War II has allowed them to achieve rapid economic development. Data on the economy of the "three centers"—the United States, Western Europe and Japan—is instructive in this regard.

At the same time as the United States has continuously expanded the arms race, diverting ever greater funding to it, the Western European states and Japan have rehabilitated their economies while simultaneously accomplishing their reconstruction. They put relatively large amounts of budget allocations at the time into

financing capital investment in the civil-production sector, the creation of modern industrial capacity, raising product market competitiveness etc. All of this also predetermined their higher economic growth rates. Whereas the average annual growth rate of production was 4.5 percent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, it reached 7 percent in West Germany and Italy and even 14 percent in Japan.

The differing levels of militarization of the economies had an effect on the rapid change in the correlation of economic forces. Whereas the United States' share of aggregate industrial production was 64.5 percent in 1948, by 1970 it had declined to 49.6 percent. The share of Western Europe grew from 34.1 to 39.3 percent over this period, and Japan's went from 1.4 to 11.1 percent.

The militarization of the economy narrows the investment base for the development of the civil sectors, and the interests of the monopolies clash first and foremost with those sectors in world markets. The withdrawal of ever greater material, financial and labor resources for military purposes cannot help but be a drag on the normal development of the economies of the capitalist states. And this is beginning to alarm a large portion of the ruling class in the United States more and more strongly.

All of the above testifies to the obvious trend of a steady narrowing of the social base of militarism and that war, the arms race and the unrestrained militarization of the economy have ceased to meet the overall class interests of the bourgeoisie. This has made it possible to pose the question of the possible reversibility of the militarization of the economy even in those capitalist countries where it has been seriously developed. The problem of converting military production into civilian is naturally not at all a simple one, but evidently a realistic solution could be found.

The overall change in world public opinion in favor of disarmament has exceedingly great significance in this process. Contemporary capitalism will not reject militarism voluntarily. Economic and political realities, the fight of broad public circles for peace and disarmament and the constructive policies of the socialist countries, however, could push it that way.

Definite shifts have been noted. An historic agreement to eliminate two classes of missiles—medium- and short-range—was concluded at the Soviet-American summit. Also attracting attention is another instance. For the first time in recent years, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, F. Carlucci, was ordered to reduce the projected fiscal 1989 military budget that had already been prepared by his predecessor, C. Weinberger, by 33 billion dollars. According to his orders, the Navy should decrease spending by almost 12 billion dollars, the Air Force by 10.5 and the Army by 9. The MX and Midgetman missile programs, new aircraft carriers and new combat helicopters are proposed for reduction or elimination. All of this is still just planning, but it is symptomatic in its own way.

Nonetheless the leading capitalist countries, including the United States, are still far from the demilitarization of their policies. The continuation of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, the results of which are proposed for utilization not only for the militarization of space and its reinforcement with space nuclear weapons, but also for the creation of fundamentally new prototypes of conventional weapons, represents a particular danger.

The leading circles of NATO, and first and foremost Great Britain and France, in no way wish to perceive the idea of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, and they are continuing to improve their own nuclear arsenals. The leadership of those countries, as well as the NATO generals, are considering plans for the nuclear "up-arming" of Western Europe after the elimination of American medium- and short-range missiles.

A communique was adopted at the December 1987 session of the NATO Council in which its participants came out in favor of an activation of collaboration between the Atlantic partners in the cause of incarnating extensive programs for the creation and deployment of more efficient types of "classical weaponry." Washington advanced a so-called "balanced technological initiative," which envisages the joint development of new types of conventional weapons by the Western countries. The U.S. administration is trying to draw both the Western European NATO countries and Japan into participating in this program.

The U.S. concept of "air-ground battle" and the NATO concept of "second-echelon strikes" (the Rogers plan) rely on the creation and utilization of new types of non-nuclear weapons with qualitatively increased destructive potential approaching the features of low-powered nuclear weapons. The Rogers plan directly assumes the surprise unleashing of combat action in concert by the ground forces, air forces and navies using all of the latest types of armed struggle at great depth for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage to enemy troops and achieving an overwhelming superiority over him along with a decisive offensive to seize his territory. And this concept has not only not been abrogated at NATO, but is rather being materially reinforced more and more in the form of the arms and means of armed struggle that are coming in.

The old manner of thinking is nonetheless quite alive, and the most reactionary and militarist circles in the United States, Western Europe and Japan have no intention of renouncing it. There is an extremely serious struggle ahead with the opponents of disarmament and with those who do not conceive of peace without mountains of arms or without the opportunity of obtaining profits from the arms race, who dream of dictating their will to other countries and peoples. The world is still just at the beginning of the path to demilitarization.

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**'Studio 9' Discussion with Lobov on Soviet
Military Doctrine**

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["Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio; with Colonel General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, first deputy chief of the general staff of the USSR armed forces; and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, doctor of historical sciences and director of the Board of APN]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades. We meet here at Studio 9 at the Ostankino Television Center to discuss the pressing problems of world politics. The theme of today's discussion has been suggested to us by numerous letters from regular viewers of our program who, judging by the responses, are, by and large, people interested in the problems of world politics, well informed, having access to the latest information, and showing an interest, not only in the released facts, but in the deeper analysis of the processes taking place in the international arena.

Recently there has been an increased number of letters addressed to Studio 9 expressing concern over military and political problems, with the new Soviet military doctrine, military threat to our country, and other questions in this sphere. Particularly, the following have asked us to dwell on these questions: Comrade Bogatyrev, research mathematician from Novosibirsk; Mikhail Novikov, a student from Kharkov; Comrade Bondareva, a doctor from Chelyabinsk; Nikolay Mikhaylovich Dvoryaninov, a fitter and turner from Voronezh; and many other regular viewers of our broadcast. I feel that the problem in which they have displayed an interest is really deserving discussion at this stage. Therefore, we have invited Colonel General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, noted researcher, doctor of historical sciences, to take part in today's discussion at Studio 9. I would like to begin our talk today with a question which, in one form or another, is to be found in numerous letters we have received. They ask: How should the present military threat to the Soviet Union be seen? Some feel that this threat remains very great, others maintain that, in practical terms, the threat does not exist. I think we should ask Vladimir Nikolayevich to voice his opinion on this matter and to give an appraisal of the military threat. Vladimir Nikolayevich, please.

[Lobov] Certainly the question posed by the viewers and by yourself is a very serious one. It should be said that this question has always concerned our Soviet people. Has this military threat ever existed, and does it exist today? What exists today is a very great quantity of stockpiled weapons, both in the West and in our own country. This consists of both nuclear and conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction and, naturally, as long as these weapons exist, there exists the obvious

threat of war. Because weapons are there not simply to exist as weapons, but to be used. Therefore, it is my opinion that if today there is no open, direct threat, the question of a threat as such has not disappeared. The threat of war does exist, and we have to do all we can to abolish it. As far as what is being done to achieve this, you are aware of the steps taken by our Government and view of the military and the steps implemented.

[Zorin] If we take a look at the dynamics of things, is the present threat of war greater than, say, 3 or 4 years ago? Has there been any change?

[Lobov] Certainly, there has been change. Changes have taken place. In the first place, very definite steps have been taken on the part of our party and government to ease the international situation, precisely by means of political measures. Naturally, with the easing of the international situation and its political factors, the threat of war must in itself decrease, and this, in fact, is the case. But from the technical point of view, from the point of view of weapons and the armed forces, I would not say that at this stage the threat has been eliminated.

[Zorin] I understand. Valentin Mikhaylovich, what is your opinion on this matter?

[Falin] I would say that weapons in themselves, considering all dangers, include the danger of an explosion for, as we know from the Chekhov play, even the gun that hangs on the wall can discharge itself. Nevertheless, the main thing that should be considered, in my opinion, in analyzing the question of whether there exists a military threat, is to take a look at what the sides possessing certain weapons proceed from in the research they do to perfect these weapons, and in the stockpiling of these weapons, in the creation of a system of bases with a certain infrastructure and distribution, in refining the perfection of the concept of weapon use. What do they proceed from?

If our Soviet military doctrine both at its genesis—later on we did go through several stages of development—and currently has as its main objective to make war impossible, if our contemporary military conception and military doctrine proceeds from the responsibility we have taken upon ourselves—and we propose that other countries do likewise—of not being the first to fire either a conventional or nuclear weapon, then the other side proceeds from the right of perhaps firing such a shot. As long... [changes thought] ...and if this is the position from which that side will proceed, then this fact alone gives rise to a threat, a military threat.

Now the following question can be asked. Military threats did exist during periods of our history. At times, this threat manifested itself in specific wars, in armed actions directed against us. But the threat also existed in another form. In the form of forcing the arms race on us; in the form of creating obstacles which prevented us from concentrating on social and economic questions.

And, putting the obvious question of war aside, we should ask: Did the other side achieve certain results with the aid of massive and systematic pressure applied on us through making the threat of war more acute? To this I would give the following answer: Much was achieved by this. At a minimum, some 30-40 years have been lost to the process of our peaceful, creative development. As a minimum, perhaps more.

[Zorin] I would like to ask both of you, Vladimir Nikolayevich and Valentin Mikhaylovich, a question. Would you briefly give us your point of view? The following thought has been expressed by some, including our specialists: Certainly the military threat does exist, but there is greater threat to us in falling behind economically, in science and technology, and that these threats are more realistic and more acute than the direct military threat. Do you agree with this? We'll start with you, Vladimir Nikolayevich.

[Lobov] War is a very complicated concept. Generally, when we speak of war, we usually speak in terms of its military component, that is the armed conflict. Many think that all is tied to this particular point, that, if there is an armed struggle, a state of war exists. If we should speak in terms of an economic or political struggle, then such a struggle today, in my opinion, has in no way subsided. The struggle continues. We know, for example, that our economic enemies, including the United States, are doing all they can to tire us out economically. Within the context of economic and political struggle, those who stage this struggle have the armed forces at their disposal, and may, at a certain stage in the development of this economic and political struggle, say to themselves—we have recourse to armed forces and arms, we can use them. Could such a scenario arise? Certainly, it could. Under no circumstances should this be discounted.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] This is how I would answer this question. One should not contrast the military side with the economic, social, scientific, and technical side. All this is a part of a whole. I think the military balance cannot be separated from the overall balance and, in some way, the economic conditions existing in one or another state; the scientific and technical potential in one or another state can, at a certain developmental stage, in terms of the balance of forces, play a role which is no less important than the differences in the military balance of forces. I am convinced that at various stages we did not view this properly. More likely, we underestimated this.

[Lobov] I fully agree that, in order to prevent a war, as a military confrontation, it is essential to conduct a most active diplomatic work, and of course, political work. So as to eliminate all economic, political, and certainly diplomatic prerequisites for resorting to the use of armed forces.

[Zorin] Vladimir Nikolayevich, if I understood you correctly, we do not have any hostile, dangerous, or

aggressive designs on the United States at the present time. But what about the past? For instance, American historians and the military, your colleagues, maintain that during the first postwar years the Soviet Union had staff plans for aggressive actions both in Western Europe and against the United States. I think that today this question is of more than just historical significance. What can you say about this?

[Lobov] Well, as far as this is concerned, I would like to say that, unlike us, the United States had such plans, and they have been published. They want to say that they were staff plans, but we say that doctrine has political as well as military and technical sides. Now a plan, be it a staff plan or some other plan, is precisely an expression of the military and technical side of military doctrine. A staff plan of this sort existed, and therefore, naturally, a strike against the Soviet Union was being prepared.

[Zorin] And as far as we are concerned?

[Lobov] As far as we are concerned, one can say unequivocally that our side, having defeated fascism, the German fascist aggressors, in 1945, was engaged in something quite different. We had to restore our national economy, the wounds of war had to be healed, the wounds dealt to us by fascism, and naturally we had no time for such plans. Everyone knows that, and it could be confirmed through documents and by any other means that we have, and from a scientific point of view as well.

[Zorin] Another question that arises in the letters that we have received recently is the question about the new Soviet military doctrine. Now a lot is being said here in general terms about this new military doctrine. But judging from the questions that we receive, our public is much less informed about its specifics. So I would like to ask you, Vladimir Nikolayevich, as a military man, to tell us what the essence of this new military doctrine is and how it differs from the doctrine, or more precisely, doctrines that guided the Soviet Armed Forces in the past.

[Lobov] The question itself is a broad one. Naturally, the question of doctrine is essentially the state's attitude towards war. After all, there is a known definition that a doctrine is a system of scientifically founded views adopted by a state toward war, toward the essence of a war, toward preparations for a war. By preparations I have in mind the preparations of the country itself for a future war, as well as the armed forces of this country for war, if such a war is possible, if you will. I would like to say something else. Sometimes we are deluded into thinking that military doctrine is shaped by the military or simply by politicians. In my opinion, this is an incorrect concept. After all, this is a system of views adopted within the state, and if we approach this doctrine from this point of view, then our doctrine has always been defensive in character.

In connection with this, we can recall the Peace Decree, the first Peace Decree, and the Leninist teaching on the

defense of our socialist fatherland—his words, which he pronounced in 1917, that we are now defenders and we will defend our motherland.

[Zorin] Then what is new in the new doctrine?

[Lobov] Well, there is a lot that is new. You understand, our new doctrine, as compared to the old doctrine, is a more offensive doctrine [boleyn nastupatel'naya doktrina]. Now this offensiveness is also not understood by some, this offensiveness of our doctrine. But the offensiveness of the doctrine lies in the fact that this doctrine is directed towards averting war. Now, in order to avert war, an active policy must be pursued; an active economic policy and an active diplomatic struggle must be waged. And herein, I would say, lies the precise offensive nature of the doctrine.

[Zorin] You have in mind not military offensiveness but political offensiveness.

[Lobov] Of course, political offensiveness, of course. It is vivid and the meaning of our doctrine lies in this. If we previously spoke about our doctrine of past years, then our doctrine was defensive. It was directed at defending our fatherland, and we always thought that because we have certain armed forces, we will defend our country by armed means.

[Zorin] Vladimir Nikolayevich, does it not bother you that, say, somebody in the West, after hearing our discussion, may say that the first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff has declared that the essence of the new military doctrine lies in its offensiveness when compared to the previous military doctrine which was defensive? Does this not embarrass you?

[Lobov] No, this does not embarrass me whatsoever, because I am talking about offensiveness in terms of averting war. This is where the offensiveness of our doctrine lies. This does sound paradoxical, doesn't it?

[Zorin] Yes.

[Lobov] But overall our position on averting war is not defensive. We are obliged, we must do everything possible with all our Soviet people, with our entire policy and even all our economic might, if you will, to avert war.

[Zorin] Very well. This is the political side of the matter. But it is the first deputy chief of the General Staff who is responding to my question.

[Lobov] That is correct.

[Zorin] So what about the military side?

[Lobov] On the military side it is clear that we are in close contact with the political side of the doctrine. And here too we must say something. The military and technical side of the doctrine reflects what armed forces are needed, how

these armed forces should be applied for the defense of our motherland, and how they should be prepared for the defense of our motherland. This is the essence of the military and technical side of our doctrine. And naturally in this respect this doctrine of ours is defensive.

We are not preparing our armed forces to attack some other state. After all, in order to make the military and technical side of this doctrine offensive the armed forces must be prepared for an offensive, for the conquest of some state. Our armed forces are not preparing for this. They are preparing to protect the motherland, to defend the motherland. Naturally, it is possible to defend the motherland. After all, if we say defensive doctrine, if we say that we will protect our motherland through defensive actions, this does not mean that in the process—for example, the very process of defending our state—there will not be some offensive actions within this defense. It is only natural that they occur as a type of combat action. But generally the military and technical essence of our doctrine is defensive.

[Zorin] I understand. Valentin Mikhaylovich, I would like to continue our conversation and ask your opinion on the following topic: Could it be said that the new Soviet military doctrine, about which so much is being said throughout the world, is not only the normal result of the development of military thought, but also the result of the fact that certain delusions and mistakes of the past have been overcome? And if you answer my question in the affirmative, then I have another question: What mistakes precisely?

[Falin] First of all, I would like to add a few things to what Vladimir Nikolayevich said. Of course, our military doctrine has undergone much change during its development. If Lenin said during the spring of 1918 that the main influence Soviet power will have on the international situation will be through its future economic and social successes, then after Lenin this idea did not play the priority role that Vladimir Ilich ascribed to it. It seems to me, and I am prepared to prove this, that under Stalin there was an excessive enthusiasm for the military factor, as part of an effort to attach particular weight to our state in international relations and in the international arena—to the detriment of other aspects of the Soviet Union's development.

It was a characteristic of Stalin himself, and a peculiarity of the military leaders under Stalin as well, to show enthusiasm, excessive enthusiasm for and overassessment of the possible role of aviation, for example, or cavalry, artillery, or tank troops, and to lack understanding or willingness to understand that these technical means and military might must, in general, be added to the system of political, economic, social, and other measures from which the overall potential of the state is formed.

Stalin yielded a second time when the United States threw a challenge at us after the war, and compensated for our peculiar shortfalls and weaknesses—and this was

understandable after such a terrible war, particularly in the economic sphere—with a military orientation. This led to the fact that very often we were imitators in the development of our equipment. We attempted to catch up to the United States. To a certain degree we tried to adapt our military thinking to the military thinking that existed in the United States. And I am convinced that this is what is meant when the highest organs of our party declare that in the past we seriously miscalculated the political, diplomatic, and other possibilities for defending our security and averting war, and this is now obviously under review.

Now these points—a rejection of all extremes that are inadequate for the contemporary level of development, both of civilization and of military equipment, and even of the ecology—these demands are finding their consistent expression in the new Soviet thinking. And I think this is an important side of the matter, a very, very important side of the matter.

[Lobov] Well, it should probably be added here, it should be said that there were mistakes in our old doctrines, if I can put it that way, particularly of course in the military and technical side, particularly before World War II, before the Great Patriotic War. For example, we developed the theory of the beginning period of the war inadequately. We made definite errors because we believed the beginning period of the war would begin this way, but things turned out to be completely different. A second point should also be stressed, the fact that the role of defense, of defensive combat actions, was belittled too, to our great regret.

[Zorin] Yes, they used to say: Only on foreign territory, and only with minor losses.

[Lobov] Yes, in other words they planned to defend the motherland essentially only with offensive combat actions, and one can even add here that the theory of the defense of the state itself was not developed, and naturally we all know what this led to. Now, by properly analyzing, in detail, both the past and the present, we are taking all these points into consideration.

[Zorin] Now we are talking about overcoming the mistakes of the past and negative manifestation. In connection with this, I want to ask you a difficult question from our viewers' letters. It is known that since the time of President Eisenhower, who by the way was a five-star general occupying the Presidential post, the term military-industrial complex, an alliance of generals and heads of military corporations, has been in use in the United States. We, too, have both generals—please excuse me Vladimir Nikolayevich—and the leaders of military enterprises with their specific interests and ways of thinking. Now comrades ask, is it possible to talk about some form of Soviet military-industrial complex, and about the influence of this complex on the political course?

I understand that this question is not an easy one for you to answer, but nevertheless let us try to respond to it.

[Lobov] Yes, of course it is a difficult question, possibly for me as a military man, right. But I will try to answer it as I see it. Of course it is a real absurdity to talk about the existence of a military-industrial complex here in the Soviet Union. Why? Well, if we take the two systems, they have a vividly expressed class nature. We cannot escape the class essence of our two systems. If we look at things from this point of view, then a merging of the military leadership in the capitalist world with the capitalists themselves—the spokesmen of the interests of this capitalist state—exists, and the aim of the military-industrial complex is to extort superprofits through the arms race and through the establishment of the most modern weapons systems and equipment. This is the meaning of the military-industrial complex.

Now, this kind of complex does not exist here because the very essence of our state in itself predetermines that a complex of this kind simply cannot exist. Yes, we do produce arms naturally in our state, and they are produced in those quantities that are essential for the defense of our state. What are these arms for, and how are they produced, and at what expense? Naturally, our state allocates certain economic resources that are given to us and earmarked for the creation of these arms. They are not detrimental to the welfare of our Soviet people, but are for the defense of our Soviet people and their interests. This is how I understand it.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] I think if we were to view the question of the military-industrial complex in a strict and formal way, then certainly Mikhail Nikolayevich is correct. We do not have either the social groups or particular parties which could count on making a profit from an arms race or personal gain from a war. We never had anything like this, we have nothing like this now, and I am convinced that we shall never have it in the future. But the question is important, and the complexity of this question is determined by the statement that, at certain stages of development, we have overestimated the military capabilities and the need to invest the amount of effort, funds, and attention to insure our security primarily through military means, and underestimated the political, economic, diplomatic, and even informational, if you will, as well as other possibilities. If, in fact, we did underestimate these factors, the question arises: Who did the underestimating, and why? Specific people underestimated these factors, people with selective hearing who, more often than not, paid greater attention to arguments of various people, including the military, and less often, and at times superficially, to the arguments of sociologists, economists, psychologists, and other experts, specialists, and politicians who argued that one thing cannot exist without the other, or that one is clearly in contradiction to the other. We are not so lucky as to be

able to have our cake and eat it too, either in the military or civil sphere.

[Zorin] But Vladimir Nikolayevich has said that military expenditure is not detrimental, provided it is spent on security.

[Falin] Unquestionably, if one is talking about ensuring the security of the people against real and pressing threats, then I feel that our people, as experience has demonstrated, will give all they have to deter this threat and to repulse the attack.

[Zorin] You speak of sacrifices. Therefore, it is detrimental.

[Falin] Certainly. Vladimir Nikolayevich did not raise the question with this in mind, and did not imply this in his answer.

[Zorin, speaking to Lobov] You see, you have a defender.

[Lobov] In that case, I can develop my thoughts further. First, when we speak of the military-industrial complex we assume that it consists of three main parts. The first is the monopoly which manufactures the arms. This is the main component, that monopoly which manufactures weapons. It consists of a certain circle comprising private capital. The second also requires a mention. This involve representatives of the armed forces who are also involved in these monopolies engaged in manufacturing weapons. Otherwise there would not be a complex. Finally, the state administrative apparatus must also be somehow involved in this complex. It too receives something in turn from the military-industrial complex. So in the West, in the United States, such complexes exist. We do not have anything like this. Ours is a peoples' government. That is why we do not speak in terms of super profits, or what we want from an arms race. I say it again. We do manufacture weapons, but these are first and foremost for the use of our armies, which are there for the defense of the state, for the defense of the Soviet people. Speaking about prosperity. Certainly that which the Soviet people give for the production of arms, for the maintainance of the army, is reflected on the prosperity of the people. There is no denying this.

[Zorin] That is what I was leading to.

But this can be put in the following way. This is being done at the expense of the material interests of every citizen of our motherland. However, there is another side to the well-being of our people. The well-being of a person is not simply that he eats, drinks, and exists. There is also the aspect of a peaceful sky above his head. Perhaps the highest form of well-being for a Soviet person, for the Soviet people, is, in my opinion, peaceful skies.

[Falin] It is difficult to argue against this position, but this does not answer all the questions within the framework of today's discussion. We have inherited many unanswered questions. Within the framework of the search for new

answers to new questions, arising in connection with a totally new situation existing in the world today, there is, in particular, this question to which the contemporary military are giving a simple affirmative answer. This applies, for example, in efforts, say, to stockpile certain types of weapons, or the readiness and willingness to have as many as the Americans have, and if possible a little more, or to aspire to have all the varieties of equipment that the United States and other Western countries have. According to today's point of view, this was not absolutely necessary, even when we were making those decisions, say in the seventies.

When we were making decisions somewhat earlier, and perhaps for a very long time, for far too long the shadow of the experiences of World War II fell over our military thinking. We were somewhat late in reaching the conclusions that were finally made in April 1985 and soon after 1985, particularly in the proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons on a global scale, and other extraordinarily important initiatives made by the general secretary of our party, which brought about real improvements and agreements with the Americans. If, for example, we would have made similar proposals 10 years earlier, then I am convinced that today the world would be far more prosperous and the sky above the world's people, including the Soviet people, would have been even more peaceful.

[Zorin] I would like to continue this discussion with a question, once again addressed to both of you. Proceeding from what you have said, is it possible that in years gone by some significant opportunities for ensuring complete and true security for our country were missed—and by this I mean both military and other opportunities? Could you give us the military side of the matter, Vladimir Nikolayevich?

[Lobov] I wish to return briefly to the previous question.

[Zorin] You wish to finish the argument.

[Lobov] Yes, because it will lead to the question you just asked.

[Zorin] Go ahead.

[Lobov] Everything that was said here is true. If 10 years ago we would have actively conducted, or began conducting, work towards slowing the arms race in the world, then perhaps the returns would have been more apparent today. But I wish to say the following: We have been speaking about the manifestation of stagnation. Stagnation manifested itself first of all in thought. Unfortunately, it seems that that manifestation of stagnation in thought allowed us to be led into this arms race. The price paid for victory in the Great Patriotic War was much too high. The price was very high. And this also influenced the political thinking, which included the thought that there ought to be more weapons, a larger

army, and that one must have everything there is in order to guarantee the security of our Soviet people. And naturally, carried by inertia, this thinking reached the period of stagnation, when it was thought that by having a large armed force and a large amount of military equipment it was possible to reliably defend our motherland. But this is what in fact allowed us to be drawn into the arms race. In all likelihood, the fact that we are now undertaking our active policy in the area of peace and in the sphere of disarmament is the best policy. It will lead to great results, and it will naturally be reflected in the composition of the armed forces.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, what can you add to this?

[Falin] I think that if one is honest, first and foremost to oneself, and if one should see all that is required and not just that which one would like to see, then we should admit that we, the Soviet Union, are also to blame that many of the solutions to many of the questions have been drawn out for as long as they have. I will cite the following as an example. In 1963, when the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom were discussing the question of banning nuclear test explosions, it would have been possible to reach an agreement on a full and all-encompassing ban concerning these three powers. That is, this would also have included a ban on underground nuclear testing. What was the bone of contention? Kennedy, if my memory serves me well, proposed eight verifications per annum, while Khrushchev agreed to only three per annum. Thus, the differences between the three and the eight prevented consensus. Even if we would have accepted eight verifications per annum as Kennedy had demanded, I am convinced that today the situation of nuclear weapons in the world would have been qualitatively different, not to mention the quantitative aspect.

With reference to this, I think this would also be true if about 10 years—or at least 8 years—earlier we had put forward proposals similar to the present conditions for disarmament and security in Europe. We had such an opportunity. All the necessary prerequisites existed. If our initiative had followed then, we would at least have gained the attention and understanding of the West European states for our proposals. But we did not make use of this opportunity. We chose to act somewhat differently. The examples can be multiplied. In the Far East, for a long time, we followed what I would not describe as the most balanced or steady path regarding several states. This, too, led to serious consequences for us which we will have to remove. I do not like to drag out my answer, but I would say that as we change over to the new thinking, including new military thinking, there is room for improving ourselves.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, you just talked about new, including military, thinking. Vladimir Nikolayevich, is it possible to say that presently we are witnessing the beginning of not only new political thinking but also new military thinking?

[Lobov] We have already spoken about our military doctrine and have said that it has a political side as well as a military and technical side. This in itself predetermines the fact that the new political thinking naturally also influences the military and technical side, as well as us, the military, the implementors, the people who come into contact with the military and technical side of our military doctrine.

Certainly, the most important aspect of our doctrine, which I would like to emphasize once again, is to prevent war. Therefore, it appears that we, the military, are also required to work out a strategy and the tactics of averting war. And we are active in this.

[Zorin attempts to interrupt and fails]

[Lobov continues] This is one aspect. There is something else that needs to be emphasized. There is the image of the enemy. If you will permit me, I will mention it. In this area, too, we have a definite new way of thinking. We certainly see our enemies. This is natural. After all, they are our enemies. This is natural. But, we now see that somehow there is a need to deal with them. In this connection I would like to quote Abraham Lincoln. When he was asked whether he had enemies, he answered: Certainly I have. But we cannot see these enemies of yours, it was said. He said: What do you mean, you cannot see them? They are there, and there, and there. But you are not destroying them, his questioners said. He said: What do you mean, I am not destroying them? I am destroying them. But we cannot see the bodies of your enemies, his questioners said. He said: But I make them my friends.

Similarly, we the military should also abandon the image of an enemy and this, too, is a new form of thinking. I would say that much is being done in this direction. Take our military contacts. As you know, Army General Comrade Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense, has on several occasions met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Carlucci. Marshall of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, also made an official visit to the United States. He met with Admiral Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [Zorin prompts Lobov on Crowe's title]. As you see, we do have military contacts, but for these contacts to exist and for them to be fruitful, naturally the new thinking is necessary. And the embryos of this thinking exist. In fact, not only the embryos of this new thinking, but the new thinking itself is developing.

[Falin] I think that there is another moment in the new Soviet military thinking which deserves attention. Today, on several occasions, we heard Vladimir Nikolayevich say that military doctrine expresses the will of the people, the general opinion of the people. I think that if we speak in terms of the recent past, then these words should be interpreted as something to be wished for. But on the whole, the participation of the people in the

formation of military policy and military doctrine has been at best indirect. Today the issue is raised that military thinking is not a forbidden topic for discussion for a society that can directly influence this military thinking, these ideas, their formation, development, and analysis of the problems.

[Zorin] An example of this would be our discussion today.

[Falin] It is intended to sharply increase the responsibility of our legislative organs during the discussion of all facets of the state's military activities, in the affirmation of the budget, and all that is connected with this, as well as in the matter of military doctrines as such. This is part of the new thinking and, in my opinion, it is extraordinarily important to bring the premises and conclusions into conformity, when military doctrines will truly become an expression of the opinion of the majority of the people and the people themselves.

[Zorin] There is another group of questions in our mail. It deals with the thesis of reasonable sufficiency—a most important thesis proposed by our country's political and military leadership. In my opinion, this thesis is essentially revolutionary in character. However, I would like... [changes thought] ...Vladimir Nikolayevich, you answered the question asked by our viewers in their letters, on what the concept of reasonable sufficiency is. I would like to ask a further question, my own question: What can we use to measure reasonableness and sufficiency when we speak about guaranteeing our national security?

[Lobov] Well, when we speak of reasonable sufficiency—and there is also a concept of defensive sufficiency—of course, we cannot contemplate only one side, for example our Soviet Union and our armed forces: We invariably consider the opposite side as well. In other words, reason is the first and foremost point in questions of defense and defense sufficiency—of maintaining, training, and using the armed forces. Now we see an interesting thing occurring in the world, as the opposite side also begins to think in a new way. It also says that indeed, one cannot solve everything by armed means—cannot keep arming oneself all the time, but should undertake measures towards disarming as well. I think that, speaking of being reasonable, one can emphasize that the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which is now under way, represents contact between the two opposite systems' reasoning, and this kind of reasoning cannot but be welcome.

Now, speaking of defensive sufficiency, one should say that defensive sufficiency is an element of our military doctrine—and our doctrine is based on this—that a proper consideration of the contemporary world situation and the character of the military threat is presumed primary. This is why our proposals, our side's proposals, presume that defensive sufficiency should be based on minimum defensive potential, not the maximum.

[Zorin] Vladimir Nikolayevich, does this mean that the present potential can be essentially reduced if we proceed from that which is unreasonable to that which is reasonable, and from that which is excessive to that which is sufficient?

[Lobov] It certainly can. Not only can it, but it must be. There is an enormous need for this.

[Zorin] I see. Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] I think that reasonable sufficiency has several dimensions. As a method of regulating questions and reaching specific agreements at talks, reasonable sufficiency means at least that we should search for an agreement at the minimum feasible level, and not aspire to the higher level that the other side has. Only in this way can we considerably speed the course of any talks and simplify the very process of reaching these agreements.

Second, this concept has two dimensions in time—a near goal and a distant goal. Lenin already formulated a distant goal: To make wars impossible, the material base for conducting war should be destroyed. The idea of general and total disarmament is derived from this. Of course, this goal is a distant one, but this is how we put the question today and this is expressed in the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine: Material conditions in the sphere of arms must be created that would deprive any state of the possibility of conducting sudden offensive actions, that is, to commit aggression against another state. In essence, this is reasonable sufficiency in its specific and feasible manifestation. We are ready for this today. Not only have we proclaimed this, we have put this proposal on the table.

[Zorin] And nothing more than this?

[Falin] Nothing more than this. Third—and I think Mikhail Sergeyevich mentioned this for the first time in Reykjavik—the matter is that if the other side experiences certain difficulties, for internal or other reasons, and is not ready to accept our proposals but intends to continue an arms race we see as unnecessary and unreasonable, we should not imitate this side and become unreasonable ourselves. We should search for the most economical and at the same time most efficient asynchronous and asymmetrical response. Today the possibility exists for us to do so, because our defensive safety factor is sufficient for us to reject the role of follower once and for all.

[Zorin] In concluding our discussion, I would like to ask you both a question that can be formulated the following way: The question is one of the asymmetry in strategic thinking, if we talk about the concepts that exist in Moscow on the one hand and in Washington on the other. We proclaimed a new military doctrine and are already acting in accordance with this new military doctrine. As for the other side, unfortunately, we have to

say that there have not been adequate steps or adequate actions taken by the other side. A question arises in this connection: Are we not getting ahead of ourselves? Are we not too far ahead of the level of contemporary thinking? In other words, are we acting realistically or are we confusing what we want with reality, to the detriment of our own security? Vladimir Nikolayevich, how would you answer this question?

[Lobov] Are we getting ahead of ourselves or not?

[Zorin] Yes.

[Lobov] You were a little surprised when I said that the political side of our doctrine is offensive. I wish to reiterate and again confirm this: We should welcome the fact that our doctrine is offensive in questions of averting war. You are now saying that we may be getting ahead of events. I think not. We are not getting ahead of ourselves in our active political work in this direction, averting war. Rather, we are doing our most active work to avert war and for disarmament.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] This is what I would say: No water flows under a lying rock. On the road to a better world, however, there are not merely rocks, but mountains of arms. Someone should begin this work. We took this initiative upon ourselves. We are setting an example, demonstrating goodwill. We clearly defined the spheres where rapid progress is possible in the interest of all, not just one side. We proceed from the premise that security today can

only be general. We repeatedly proved that we do not claim any privileges for ourselves in this process, and we do not seek unilateral gains. We are prepared to be equal among equals in everything and everywhere.

Being a realist, I think that American military thinking will go through several stages in its development. There may even be very serious aggravations. The latest U.S. naval doctrine is an example: It is extremely aggressive and clearly provocative, even by U.S. assessments. We should take it into consideration. We cannot ignore it. This is a threat, a challenge to us, and an obvious one at that. But this does not mean that we should again let someone lead us away from the general road of mankind's development. We—mankind, not just the Soviet Union—have no choice. Today we should deal with more topical problems than attempts to crush each other by military means. We should at least save the environment, because if we do not, the world will perish without a war.

This is the alternative. We—as a system, party, and society—have presented our categorical and unambiguous choice. We answered these challenges. Today we invite the other side to live up to the demands of the time.

[Zorin] Well, our time on the air has run out. Unfortunately, we did not discuss all questions and did not answer all the questions that were received. We shall return to the other questions later. Now it remains for me to thank you for participating in our discussion, and thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until we meet again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

Officer's Wife Complains to Trade Union Paper
PM1110084588 Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Oct 88 p 1

[Letter from F. Khayrova: "I Want to Ask the USSR Defense Minister"—TRUD headline]

[Text] On 24 February this year TRUD published a report by Yu. Dmitriyev and Yu. Mayorov entitled "Missile Leaves Its Position...." It described the withdrawal of a Soviet military unit from GDR territory. A photograph showed a leading combat detail under the command of Senior Lieutenant Sh. Khayrov, my husband. The report expressed the hope that the motherland would take care of the families of the officers and ensigns, and that they would not be looked on as "aliens" at their new places of service.

But what happened? When our unit returned to the Soviet Union, I was unable to travel to the new garrison with my husband. We were frankly told: Barracks have not yet been rebuilt for you. My husband "settled" in a former shower room, and I had to set off, with my son and daughter, to my parents in Kazan.

Many families of officers from our former unit were in this position. The family of Captain Kapustin is sheltering in the red corner. The families of Captain Savin, Senior Lieutenant Reneskov, Lieutenant Shamsutdinov, and many others have been divided.... In addition unpleasantness has begun for some officers while in service. They have been offered posts involving demotion. When my husband "turned stubborn" he was invited to apply for demobilization from the ranks of the Soviet Army....

All this is incomprehensible, and hard to take. Is it that our families have been "dismantled," so to speak, along with the missiles? Is it that more attention is paid to dead missiles than to us living people? It turns out that the journalists were correct in writing in this report that this has already happened—when our army's numerical strength was reduced and promises about pensions, apartments, and daily living conditions for families were not kept. Perhaps the Defense Ministry leadership will answer the question: How much longer do we have to wait for our fate to be decided?

[Signed] On behalf of wives of missile troops officers, F. Khayrova, Kazan.

Formulating Problems for Air Defense Missile Firing

81440044a Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian
No 8, Aug 1988 pp 70-71

[Fire Problem, published under the heading "Solving Fire Problems for Antiaircraft Guided Missiles": "Posing the Problem (Exercise 2)"; for previous problems see *Voyennyy Vestnik*, No 7, 1988]

[Text] The posing of the problem is the incentive which forces the commander of the fire unit, in showing creativity and initiative, to take a decision in a nonstandard situation. Its essence is that it forms the goal (the desired results) of the forthcoming actions as well as the conditions under which they must be achieved. The effectiveness of all the subsequent work by the commander depends largely upon how precisely and concretely this has been done.

An analysis of various situations makes it possible to establish three, albeit substantially different but interrelated, methods for the occurrence of the problems.

First. The commander expects concrete instructions from the superior command body to work out new methods of employing the weapon. Most often they come to him in the form of amendments or supplements to the existing guiding documents.

Second. The commander independently studies all that is new which has appeared in the tactics of the probable enemy. And then considering these new features, he investigates the combat capabilities of the weapons in order to outline the ways making it possible to realize them most completely.

Third. He constantly surveys the literature, he analyzes the experience of innovators in related areas and thus discovers new materials and devices, ideas and methods, theories and so forth. He proposes the methods of realizing these in practical activity.

We should point out that in relying solely on instructions from above, an officer should be prepared for the fact that he may not be able to plan his subsequent actions in detail due to a lack of time. Then the only way out can be the carrying out of the task at any price. In this sense the given method is the most costly.

The other two ways require a creative approach from the commander and the ability himself to see the possible tasks in the course of combat, outline the ways to implement these and then act without fearing the responsibility.

A thorough analysis of the collected or incoming information and the capabilities of the fire unit helps in correctly formulating the problem. This is best done in successively answering the questions which derive one from another. Such a process for better perception can be presented graphically.

Let us point out that depending upon the degree of detailing, the posing of the problem can be "broad" or "narrow." Naturally, there will be more probable solutions the more widely the problem is formulated. On the other hand, their number is reduced with a rise in the constraints and prohibitions.

A similar method is applicable for formulating other problems which seemingly are not directly related to the firing of a SAM [Surface-to-Air Guided Missile].

Example. Let us assume that a new reconnaissance aircraft with the following specifications has appeared in the combat zone of adjacent air defense weapons. The range of its flight (at a speed of 150 km an hour) is 1,110 km, the ceiling is 4,875 m and the maximum speed is 222 km an hour. The over-all length of the aircraft is 8.16 m with a height of 2.31 m. The wing span reaches 12 m with an area of 15.85 m². The weight without a payload is 880 kg.

An analysis of the information can be carried out in the sequence shown in Diagram 1. Then the problem will be formulated as follows. To determine whether or not the fire unit can destroy this aircraft. What measures must be carried out so that the firing is effected? How to achieve the most effective fire?

Problems for Drill

Problem 1. The unclassified foreign press has pointed out that recently the area of employing remote controlled drones ([Rus.] DPLA) has been significantly broadened. It has been proposed that they be employed for conducting reconnaissance as well as for complicating the air situation, for neutralizing air defense radars and destroying different air and ground targets. Foreign military specialists put among their merits high maneuverability, small size as well as the low level of infrared radiation and noise. Figs. 1 and 2 give variations of the combat employment of the DPLA.

Formulate the problem of working out measures ensuring effective fire against the DPLA.

Problem 2. The journal *Tekhnika i vooruzheniye*, No 1, 1987, has provided information on an indicator developed by Col V. Shaposhnikov and Lt Col N. Sapiga for the presence of direct or alternating current in a circuit. The range of use: from 12 to 600 volts.

Formulate the problem for employing the designated indicator in the fire unit.




Diagram 1




Fig. 1. Flight of Drone to Reconnoiter Ground Mobile Targets (Variation)

Key:
1—Climb at speed of 160 km/hour;
2 & 6—Flight at altitude of around 2,000 m at speed of 220 km/hr;
3 & 8—Clarification of navigation data;
4—Target search (flight time over 2 hours, altitude 200-500 m, speed 150 km/hr);
5—Interception, identification and tracking of target;
7—Transmission of intelligence data.




Fig. 2. Flight of Attack Drone to Search Out and Destroy Detected Target (Variation)

Key:
1—Search zone (search time over 3 hours);
2—Target detection and identification;
3—Dive attack on target.




Diagram 2

Night Tactical Training Problems

18010257 Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian
No 5, May 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Sidoruk, a *Znamenosets* correspondent, under the heading "Returning to What Has Been Printed:" "The Deficiencies Were Illuminated by the Night"]

[Text] During the night tactical exercise the squad of Junior Sergeant A. Telyashev, while operating on the flank of the company's combat formation, suddenly deviated from the basic direction of the attack. There was a slipup in the actions of the motorized infantrymen. Part of the targets were not hit. This instance illuminated a number of problems in the night training of soldiers. They were discussed in the material "The Night Will Not Write off Everything," (*Znamenosets* No 1, 1988). A few months after the material was published our correspondent visited the motorized infantry. What the magazine published was studied, the criticism was taken into account and the necessary conclusions were drawn from it. A great deal of attention began to be paid in the subunits to leadership training and methodological exercises for instructors. They are carried out strictly in accordance with the plan. Night exercises and drills are carried out in a darker time of day. Their logistical support was improved. The training facilities of the artillery school were utilized more effectively.

It would seem that a lot was done. But then the control exercise took place in the subunit. It showed that the gain in the soldiers' training level was insignificant. As before the motorized infantrymen shot poorly at night and committed errors in carrying out assignments. Why is it that the collective did not succeed in overcoming the lagging and in equipping the soldiers in a short time with solid skills for operating in conditions of reduced visibility?

The final shots were heard at the firing range. The subordinates of Captain S. Derksen finished the exercise of practice firing and received an overall good score. The commander of the subunit, however, drew the attention of the trainees to shortcomings such as the inability of some soldiers to aim with the aid of self-illuminated caps, to conduct fire at targets that revealed themselves through the flashes of shots, slowness in reloading the weapon and in correcting fire. If we eliminate these shortcomings, the officer emphasized, we can make a noticeable improvement in the results of firing at night. At the control firing that took place at the end of the month, however, as was said already the subunit with difficulty received a satisfactory rating.

"There is no consistency," a staff officer of the company commented on what had occurred. "Last time they fired better."

It is true that at times the soldiers of the company achieved rather good scores, especially in the daytime exercises. This gave the commanding officer and other

officers hope that the subunit would handle tactical and firing assignments successfully under nighttime conditions too. Consistent results in firing came slowly, however, for the motorized infantrymen. It happened that individuals among them became flustered and committed slips in simple situations. Then at the control exercise the lack of steadiness in the skills of the motorized infantrymen in carrying out firing exercises with which they had long been familiar was manifested fully.

For example, at the directrix of the BMP the soldiers conducted fire from the armament of the fighting vehicle of the infantry. Captain Derksen, Senior Lieutenant V Kobzar and Lieutenants V Bedov and S Chokla set a good example for the trainees by hitting the targets accurately. Their example, however, was followed only by Senior Sergeants V Anfriyev and V Kitsenko, who also completed the exercise excellently. But a number of other specialists had nothing to brag about. Senior Sergeant V Megush missed the main target. Private M Tikhvatov was late in opening fire. Private A Oleynik used up a large part of his cartridges on the first two targets. Private R. Loginov fired at the targets with a fixed sight. Private K Ziyadulayev was not able quickly to clear up the jam that occurred during firing...

It was not possible to find a simple answer, a sort of common denominator to explain the reasons for the mistakes that were committed. One thing did stand out clearly: no matter what mistake of the persons firing was analyzed, its roots lay beyond the bounds of the training for a given concrete exercise. It turned out that each miss that occurred during firing was predetermined by shortcomings in the work of the platoon leaders and NCOs of the company. Let us talk about this in greater detail.

During the second run Junior Sergeant S Kormushin's crew was late in beginning the exercise. It was revealed that this was the fault of the driver-mechanic. In addition he did not observe the established movement speed and spent too much time at the short halt. What is this? The result of the negligence of one person? Not just that. The squad leader is supposed to direct the actions of the driver-mechanic. But he did not do this.

In the following run similar mistakes were repeated. The checker in this regard noted: "Some of the squad leaders consider themselves to be passengers."

It also was revealed that not all of the NCOs are able to correct the firing of gunner-operators. The effect of inertia was shown: during daytime firing the correction of fire was successfully conducted by the person who was firing himself. When carrying out the exercise at night it is significantly more difficult to do this. The person firing did not, however, receive the needed assistance from the squad leaders. Private Yu Alekseyev, for example, fired at the wrong target. The young commander, however, did not correct him.

A whole series of miscalculations in the work of the NCOs found their echo in the course of the control firing. As the analysis showed, the subunit has not yet attained a precise combination of the principles and methods of training. In the effort to increase the number of field exercises and to make wider use of the firing range that lies not far from the unit the subunit often forgets about the quality of working out questions of night training of the soldiers and the strict observance of the principle that each commander must train his subordinate.

Let us take the firing drill with which we began our story. At first glance it went off productively. But how was this achieved? Through the fact that the officers of the company took on themselves the handling of practically all the questions of the subject. By taking the NCOs' places at the training sites they not only deprived them of the possibility of perfecting the practice of operations and independently assessing the work of subordinates but also of concerning themselves personally about the quality of field training of the motorized infantrymen.

Similar substitutions occurred previously too. They dampened the NCOs' ardor and reduce their role in training the soldiers. Therefore it happens that at certain training sites the soldiers stand around idly for a long time waiting for their turn to carry out assignments, permit elements of simplification and fail to deal with questions fully. And the young commanders do not show the necessary initiative and interest. Some of them, it happens, completely give up their positions. For example, Senior Sergeant V Megush, relying on the mastery he had previously attained skills lost his practiced skills and stopped being concerned about raising the tactical and firing training level. And this at one time was a competent and enterprising junior commander.

The knowledge and practical skills obtained in the system of leadership training, judging from all the evidence, are not sufficient for the NCOs of the company. This means that it is necessary to do supplemental work with them. By the way, not all of the platoon leaders try to equip their assistants with methodological procedures for training and indoctrinating subordinates. Lieutenant V Bedov, for example, in the opinion of the commander of the subunit devotes little attention to training the NCOs, compiling training maps with them and skillfully using methodological innovations when training specialists. It is quite understandable that the methodological level of training exercises carried out by the NCOs of his platoon continues to be low.

The role of the individual approach in training motorized infantrymen is also underestimated in the subunit. Let us say that Sergeant A Cherenok and Senior Sergeant A Kostikov while conducting drills with their subordinates noticed several times that the young soldiers were making mistakes. They were in no hurry, however, to help eliminate these mistakes, apparently assuming that it would be more useful if the trainees figured things out

for themselves. As they say, let them suffer - they will remember better. Thus the NCOs often took the roles of passive spectators straight through to the end of the training drills. But after all these training drills preceded the trip to the firing range. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subordinates of these NCOs did worse than the rest in the control exercises.

What sort of conclusion should be drawn from all that has been said? Tactical and firing training of the soldiers of the subunit, especially in nighttime conditions, continues to be a bottleneck in the field training of the motorized infantrymen. The weakest link is the training of NCOs. The measures that have been taken in the collective to correct the situation are insufficient. This means that the officers of the company obviously need to exercise special supervision over the work with NCOs. To spend more time in preparing for exercises and to give the young commanders practice in working with people directly in training drills and not to supplant them.

Achieving consistent results in night firing is not a simple task. To solve it we think it would not be out of place to return slow learners to material that has already been gone through in order to firm up their knowledge and skills, especially in conducting fire in conditions of reduced visibility. It would be useful to segregate the laggards in a separate group, which would study under the leadership of one of the more experienced platoon leaders.

Special responsibility for training the motorized infantrymen to fire small arms and the armament of the fighting vehicle accurately is borne by the NCOs of the subunit. They must place their emphasis in working with subordinates on the individual approach. To explain to every soldier what his weak points are and to give concrete tasks for independent drill on one operational procedure or another and then check on their implementation. It is important to ensure that the trainees obtain firm habits in aiming and correcting fire and learn well the rules for night firing.

The help given by the best specialists to their colleagues is also of great significance. In the company there are gunners who hit the target accurately under any circumstances, day or night. Among these are Senior Sergeants V Afanasyev, A Kostikov and A Akashev. There is no doubt that if these soldiers occupied themselves with the laggards they would be able to speed their training noticeably.

The deficiencies revealed in the control exercise were a serious cause for demanding analysis of the state of combat training of the motorized infantrymen. Eliminating the shortfalls and omissions in our opinion constitutes an important reserve in improving the level of field training.

Comment on Interceptors' Light Filters

18010205[Editorial Report] Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian in the 25 August 1988 Second Edition carried on page 2 an 1500-word article by Major A. Voynov, entitled: "The Commander and Modern

Battle: Do the 'Elders' Go into Battle Alone?" In discussing the operations of interceptor aircraft in training work in the Moscow Air Defense District, the author notes a limitation of the light filters in the canopies of the aircraft. He states that: "The sun was in the pilots' eyes and even the protective light filters were unable to preserve them from the light."

Navy Day Comments of Fleet Commanders Highlight Restructuring

Editorial Introduction

*18010120a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2*

[Text] On the eve of Navy Day our permanent correspondents met with the fleet commanders and asked them to tell about how the tasks set by the All-Union Conference of the CPSU are being carried out in the units. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Cpt 1st Rank V. Shirokov, Cpt 2nd Rank A. Pilipchuk, and Cpts 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko and V. Pasyakin met with the fleet commanders.

Support the Innovator-Commander

*18010120b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2*

[Interview with Adm G. Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet]

[Text] After graduating from the Lenin Komsomol Higher Naval Institute for Underwater Navigation, Lt. G. Khvatov asked to be sent to the Pacific Fleet. And his entire service, if you do not count his years of further study (he graduated from the Naval Academy and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy with distinction) was spent in the Far East. Many years of his command activity are connected with submarines. He has been a ship commander, chief of staff, and unit commander. Currently he commands the Pacific Fleet.

First of all we must remember the conclusion of the party conference: in spite of changes for the better in the international situation, the military threat remains a reality. From this comes our main task—to maintain combat capability at the necessary level. What must be done to achieve this? First of all we must attain the superiority of qualitative parameters over quantitative ones. It follows that inter alia, every sailor must increase his qualifications, and raise his personal responsibility. In this most complex work there is for me, let us say, a source of support—genuine innovator-commanders. In the fleet there are more than a few of these. And we must in all ways support their undertaking.

The party conference and the recently conducted CPSU Central Committee plenum gave a graphic example of how we must look at things, and soberly analyse the situation. If we transfer such an approach to our fleet then we will see more than a few "sore spots." For example, it is very important to raise the training of commanders and staff officers to a new level, so that they will be ready and able to take responsibility without upon themselves waiting for some kind of directives. Here again we need innovative actions. During the time of restructuring they are of special value.

It is clear that exhortations alone will not achieve success. Military science, technology, and weaponry do not stand still. This means that everyday commanders and staffs must worry about the renewal of the material-training base. Thus we must have more computer equipment and use it more productively for the solution of training problems. Meanwhile some here still exhibit an unfounded caution, or else they are simply not psychologically prepared for this.

The party conference in the most decisive manner spoke out for social reorientation of the economy. As a delegate I thought about this no small amount. Unarguably, in our fleet too there are positive tendencies in the development of the social sphere. But the fact that we are still turning very slowly to the individual person is also perfectly clear. It is perfectly natural that he evaluates the changes according to his own, so to speak, living standards. In the fleet one of the urgent problems is housing. And if we look at it from the perspective of the party conference, then noticeable improvements have only been achieved in the unit where Captain 1st Rank V. Rodionov is chief of the political department (as a matter of fact he was a delegate to the party conference). True, positive results have been noted in the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka garrison. But there is not much of this. Today significant means are earmarked for the building of social and cultural sites—now the object is to see to the concrete realization of these plans.

What else troubles us? I will not hide the fact that such negative phenomena as "dedovshchina," non-regulation relations, continue to exist. I do not relieve myself of responsibility for them but I consider these problems not purely an internal matter of the army and navy. We must embark here on a state-wide scale. The schools and Komsomol must have their say. We cannot get by without their help. And together we can solve everything more quickly.

Now we need once again to critically analyse our system of education and the sphere of human relations. For the matter lies behind all of this.

The Priority of Collective Thought

*18010120c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2*

[Interview with Vice Adm Feliks Nikolayevich Gromov, commander of the Northern Fleet]

[Text] He was born in 1937 in Vladivostok. His father left for the front as a volunteer and died on the Kursk salient. He graduated from the S.O. Makarov Pacific Ocean Higher Naval Institute and from the Naval Academy. Until 1976 he served in the Pacific in the positions of battery commander, gunnery unit [BCh-2] commander, senior aid, and commander of a destroyer. He commanded a cruiser, was chief of staff and commander of a formation of surface ships.

From 1984 Feliks Nikolayevich was First Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet. This year he was named commander.

Sometimes people ask me: you were promoted recently, do you not have desires to change something right away, to restructure, to do things your own way? The underlying cause of such questions is understood—a new broom is meant for sweeping. I can say that I do not see the need to introduce any serious correctives into the course conducted by the fleet command from 1985 on. And here is why. In my previous post I had direct contact with the working out of the fundamental directions of the activity of the fleet military soviet, and I intend to develop those directions in the future. I am for the priority of collective thought.

In this regard I would like to speak about the widening of democratic bases in the activity of the commanders and staffs and in the life of the collectives.

It may well be that now there is no such aspect of our fleet life which could not stand growth in those inseparably entwined areas of democracy and glasnost. For example, currently we have begun to solve cadre questions in a more collegial manner. But there are still instances where an officer will make it to a high position and only then will it become clear that he deals rudely with subordinates, that he is intolerant of others' opinions. Glasnost in the nomination of candidates to high offices and an obligatory consideration of the opinion of party organizations should be an insurmountable barrier in the path of such people.

The further development of democratic processes depends for the most part on us. For example, suddenly you learn that this or that chief has given an order to the secretary of the party bureau or party committee to call a communist to party responsibility, or in some other manner has tried to command the party organization. We must attentively examine all our reserves for democratization—this will guarantee a new quality of work with people, and this means a new level of our affairs. In the fleet substantial advances can not be achieved without improvement in the style of the work of the organ of the directorate. The staffs have only just begun to restructure. Certain chiefs of staff do not wish to spoil the holiday mood, and it would be possible to name more than one staff where the level of direction and organization work, to put it gently, leaves us wanting more.

Qualitative indicators in combat training are directly linked to the ability of commanders and political workers to work creatively and with initiative. This is how Captains 1st Rank V. Masorin, R. Chebotarevskiy and others work. But still we must have more such people if we want to move matters decisively ahead.

And one more factor of no small importance: I have in mind the necessity of widening the independence of ship and formation commanders in the organization and

conduct of studies, training, and exercises, and in the defining of the subject matter therein. The courses and manuals for combat training currently being used—incidentally they were adopted not long ago—attempt to foresee virtually every step the commander takes in this regard. I consider such crude regulation unjustified. And the fleet command will introduce corresponding suggestions to the Main Staff of the Navy.

No Task More Important

18010120d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2

[Interview with Adm M. Khronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet]

[Text] Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral M. Khronopulo was born in 1933. He graduated from the S.O. Makarov Pacific Ocean Higher Naval Institute, the Naval Academy, and the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Academy. He commanded various ships, formations, and units. He was a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress and is a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Calling us, the military delegates to the conference, together after the party forum, the minister of defense once again emphasized that at the contemporary stage, an increase in the level of combat readiness is projected by means of qualitative parameters. In connection with this the problem of activation of the human factor comes to the foreground. We can say that for us now there is no more important task than this. I personally am deeply convinced that without capable and dedicated cadres, restructuring is impossible.

In the implementation of cadre policy in our fleet a definite system has formed thanks to which we have not only overcome "the cadre hunger" which hindered qualitative growth of the command link. We have sufficient reserves for our own designation and have also, so to speak, shared trained cadres of an important element with other fleets.

However even now the cadre question has not lost its significance and meaning; it remains primary for us. We are striving to achieve early professional orientation for young officers, we are attempting to ensure that their career advancement depends on moral and service qualities and not on family or other connections. We are improving the quality of the system of training the second echelon.

The second direction is high professional training first of all for officers.

In this academic year we have also significantly raised the demands for the special training of the warrant officer staff. For warrant officers and petty officers are

professionals who have chosen a narrow specialty for their whole life. And if they are not masters of their specialty, it means they will poorly fulfill their obligations.

Now the fleet administration holds to the following arrangement (it is supported by the party organizations): Whoever fails to raise his academic qualification or to affirm his master of military affairs rank does not receive monetary awards according to the year's results. Thus there can be no automatic egalitarianism. We hope that this concrete measure strengthened by explanatory-educational work will stimulate activity.

I consider improvement of the quality of combat training to be no less important a link in the solution of the problems noted. And here I would like to stop at a principally important moment. Traditionally the fleet directorate of combat training is concerned with the organization of combat training. But during a war, personnel will be directed by the staffs. Therefore this year we are introducing combat training directed by the staffs and the combat training directorate will check up on the fulfillment of plans and on the quality of combat training. For the solution of tasks at sea is conducted by those staffs which will direct personnel in battle. This will give, in my opinion, significant advance in the quality and effectiveness of combat training; it will bring it closer to real life conditions.

We must, I think, consider the solution of social problems one of the effective levers of activation of the human factor. The housing question is a very pertinent one for us. The solution to this problem is slow in coming. And last year petty officers and warrant officers and their families in one of the garrisons, as an experiment, constructed a 65-unit apartment house by means of the direct labor method [khozsposob]. This year with the benefit of the accumulated experience, in the same manner a 110-unit apartment house is being built. Thus we are trying to find all the available reserves for the solution of the housing problem. And I note that people, feeling a genuine concern about them, are trying to serve better.

We Have Many Like-thinking People
18010120e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2

[Interview with Adm Vitaliy Pavlovich Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet]

[Text] He has been a member of the Navy since age 15. He graduated from the Saratov Naval Preparatory Institute and then from the Lenin Komsomol Higher Naval Institute for Underwater Navigation. He began his on-board service as group commander, with time he headed the crew of an atomic submarine. He is a member of the CPSU since 1957.

Vitaliy Pavlovich has served long years in the North and the Pacific Fleets; he worked in the Navy's Main Staff.

He graduated from the Naval Academy and the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Academy. Since 1985 he has commanded the Baltic Fleet.

Not a single link in the chain of command can remain outside of restructuring . . . This situation I consider a key in the solution of the tasks set forth by the 19th Party Conference. The command mechanism of previous years has shown its inability to work effectively or to give full results. In connection with this we too had to honestly, without consideration of personal interests, answer the question: Has not the command apparatus of the fleets grown heavy with the years?

Having analysed the degree to which ships and certain other units were loaded down with division staffs, for example, we came to the conclusion that without any loss of combat readiness their functions could be transferred to higher staffs. Political organs and the party organizations have expressed similar opinions on this question. This is strong support. Furthermore I would like to forewarn the too ardent performers: restructuring of the command organs is not reduced simply to cutbacks. We must understand that the aim of any reorganization is a higher final result. At times there is a necessity to simply introduce order in one's own jurisdiction, to distribute everything to the appropriate places. Here is a concrete example. We removed a naval engineering service from subordination to the chief of the fleet's rear services and resubordinated it to the deputy commander for construction. This allowed us to concentrate in one set of hands both the construction organizations and the engineering equipment. And today we can already see improvements. Including in the fleet's social sphere.

Improving the system of command we are counting on a breach in the positions of the bureaucracy, which in the military environment, unfortunately, still occupies certain positions. I think that here it is extremely necessary for us to attain radical changes in a short time. Whether we succeed or fail depends first of all on the cadres, on the personnel at hand which we now have at our disposal.

I must note that on the path of restructuring we have many like-thinking people. And there will be still more because we are not in a hurry to count as enemies of restructuring those who still do not accept everything. We must teach them patiently and render practical help.

The party conference has contributed much both for deepening the understanding of the role and meaning of democratic processes taking place in our society. From certain servicemen, including high ranking commanders we have heard that bringing democratic foundations, glasnost and pluralism of opinions into military relations should be done with caution. I will note to the contrary: as for guaranteeing the rights of servicemen as citizens of the USSR, there is no room for limitations and halfway measures. I will add: the new atmosphere—the atmosphere of glasnost and openness yields definite signs of growth.

JPRS-UMA-88-025
21 October 1988

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NAVAL FORCES

One particular is in my view noteworthy: today's discussion is also going so to say in the fairway of restructuring: it is a holiday but we are speaking of tasks, worries and

problems. Nevertheless, using this opportunity I send via the newspaper regards on the occasion of Navy day to all the sailors and our veterans. UD/336

Moscow MD Work After 4 June Explosion at Arzamas

*18010427 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Unsigned Article: "When the Calamity Came"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press, on 4 June an explosion of three boxcars, loaded with industrial explosives, took place near the Arzamas-1 railroad station. As a result, a large housing area and station structures were destroyed. Seventy-three people are believed to have been killed, and there are 229 wounded in hospitals.

Presently a governmental commission, headed by G. Vedernikov, deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, is at work in this industrial center of Gorky Oblast. Efforts to eliminate the consequences of the calamity are led by the oblast civil defense headquarters, headed by oblast ispolkom chairman A. Sokolov. Owing to the efforts of emergency repair teams train traffic has resumed. Medical personnel from the oblast and Moscow are struggling to save the wounded. The internal affairs organs have organized strict control over order in the city and protection of material valuables.

Our correspondent, Col V. Zhitarenko, got in touch by telephone with Maj Gen Oleg Sidorovich Komlev, Moscow Military District deputy commander for civil defense, who is located in Arzamas and is currently fulfilling the duties of chief of the operations group for elimination of the consequences of the explosion. Here is what he stated.

"Composite mobile subunits got to work already on Saturday. They operated essentially around the clock, for people remained in the rubble of the residences. For this reason they worked mainly by hand, although we also have special equipment for eliminating rubble. Thus,

more than 70 destroyed houses have already been removed, and more than 60 more have been carefully inspected. Many houses that received varying degrees of damage are being repaired.

"Military medical personnel are assisting the victims. The personnel of our subunits are hauling furniture and the personal items of the residents out of the damaged houses. Along with the militia they are maintaining order on the streets of the city.

"On Saturday already Arm Gen K. Kochetov, military district commander, arrived in Arzamas. Immediately the soldiers were assigned their missions of eliminating the consequences of the accident. This fact, I believe, indicates the effectiveness: The subordinates of officers A. Chusin, P. Kushkin, and V. Bulutskiy on Saturday were still many kilometers from Arzamas, and some were carrying out missions of fighting forest fires, but they required only a few hours in order to accomplish long marches here, in order to be included immediately in the work.

"I cannot fail to name those who are selflessly clearing rubble, extracting wounded, and rendering them first aid: captains I. Mitropolskiy and K. Titov, senior lieutenants A. Kirpiy and A. Pavlov, and privates S. Fateyev, V. Rulko, S. Bykov and S. Lazarev. Yes, strictly speaking, all the soldiers are working without sleep or rest.

"The efforts will continue for many more days yet. You see, we not only have to clear away the rubble. A large amount of work is associated also with repairing the buildings that are to be restored. Military personnel will also take part in the construction of new houses, including prefabricated models".

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**Sandalov's 'Secret' Book Published in
VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL**
LD1510153888 Moscow TASS in English
1512 GMT 15 Oct 88

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The heading "The 'Secret' Stamp Removed" starts the latest issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL (MILITARY-HISTORY JOURNAL) of the USSR Defence Ministry which was offered for sale for the first time here yesterday. Under this heading the journal starts printing a book by Colonel General Sandalov, which was stamped "secret" up to this time. In this well-documented work the author reveals reasons for the defeat of Soviet troops at the initial period of the Second World War. The newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA writes about this today.

The first issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL was put out in August 1939. The journal printed memoirs of prominent Soviet military leaders, fundamental articles on the history of the civil war, military art, the history of national liberation movements, revolutions and uprisings. Much space was devoted to comments on archive documents. This rich factual material was accessible only for a limited number of people. The publication which Muscovites saw on open sale at long last, is meant for the general readership. The new headings of the journal include "From Archives of the USSR Defence Ministry," "In Search of the Truth," "How It Was Like," "From Unpublished Manuscripts."

The newspaper writes that the line for declassifying hitherto secret documents will be continued. Materials to be published in the next few issues include Stalin's orders of the war years, analysis of the work of the State Defence Committee, a discussion on the initial period of the war against Nazi Germany.

The words on removing the "secret" stamp can be also seen in another today's newspaper. We mean declassification of the topographic map scale 1:200,000 whose publication for general sale was considered a crime up to this time. The newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA quotes in this connection the words by Viktor Yashchenko, head of the Chief Administration for Geodesy and Cartography. He writes that now the map can be used by every tourist. In future tourist maps with a scale of 1:50,000 and smaller will show all rivers, their underground sections, drying-up rivers, shoals, springs, waterfalls, areas of inundation of large rivers and lakes, glaciers with contour lines and altitude benchmarks, caves and other objects. According to Yashchenko, in 1989 the USSR plans to issue new general geographic and tourist maps of 249 titles.

**New Journal Rubrics: 'Declassified' and 'From
Ministry Archives'**
18010130 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 88 p 6

[Item by V. Fomin: "The Truth about History"]

[Text] A meeting of the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL editorial college with readers was held on 13 October in Moscow, at the Soviet Culture Pavilion at the USSR Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy. The members of the editorial college spoke about the journal's problems and creative plans.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent the journal's chief editor Col V. Filatov said: "To turn our face to the broad reader, to publish information in a popular and accessible form, to not avoid sharp historical moments—these are the editorship's tasks today. With this goal we have restructured our thematic plan and changed the manner in which we present material. Starting with the October issue the rubric "Declassified" ["Grif sekretnosti snyat"] has appeared in the journal's pages. The rubric "From the USSR Defense Ministry Archives" has also been introduced. In issue number ten there is an article about the state of military-historical science in China. In preceding issues several orders of J. V. Stalin were published in full with the necessary explanations. These include Order No. 227, which has gone down in history as the "Not One Step Backwards!" Order, and Order No. 270, on measures of punishment for those taken prisoner.

We will dedicate the first issue of the journal for 1989 in full to Soviet and German documents connected with the Battle of Moscow. UD/330

**Motives, Impact of German-Soviet Nonaggression
Pact Explored**
*18000619 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 24 Aug 88 p 3*

[Interview with Vasilii Mikhaylovich Kalish, doctor of historical sciences and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, by A. Novikov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent: "On the Threshold of the War"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Recently, the blank spots on the historical map of our country have gradually begun to disappear, but there are still quite a few of them. One of the gaps is the USSR's foreign policy in the prewar period.

[Answer] The conditions for our victory in the war are said to have been prepared in the thirties. But, unfortunately, very significant prerequisites for the defeat of the Red Army at the very outset of the war also took shape during those years. Following the 20th party congress the accepted thing in our literature has been to say that the reasons for the failures of the Red Army lie in I.V.

Stalin's miscalculation in determining the date of fascist Germany's attack on the USSR. There was indeed a miscalculation, but of what kind—a random mistake? Or perhaps only a link in a chain of errors? Let us think about it.

The thirties.... Fascism's rise to power in Germany. Japan launches aggression in the Far East and Italy and North Africa. January 1934—Stalin's speech at the 17th party congress, where he says that the situation has become more acute, that parties representing militant imperialism and parties representing war and revenge were moving into the foreground, that things were clearly headed toward a new war. The words seem to be right, but this was nothing more than a registration of the facts. But was a more profound evaluation made of the situation that had come about in the world, and what conclusions were drawn about how we must act?

[Question] Lines were drawn in the leadership of the party and country over these issues in the thirties. The group of political and military figures who held the power—I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.Ye. Voroshilov, A.A. Zhdanov, L.M. Kaganovich, G.M. Malenkov, S.M. Budenny, and L.Z. Mekhlis—took the line that the capitalist encirclement was entirely hostile to the Soviet Union and regarded fascism as nothing more than just one of the varieties of imperialism. The danger of German fascism, its military threat to the Soviet Union as well as to the countries of bourgeois democracy, was underestimated.

[Answer] N.I. Bukharin, M.M. Litvinov, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, I.P. Uborevich, A.I. Yegorov, and others represented the other school of political and military thinking. N.I. Bukharin stated the proposition that fascism in Germany was a qualitatively new political phenomenon in the system of imperialism. In his speech at the 17th party congress he declared that fascist ideology was preaching "outright piracy," and outright "philosophy of bestiality," and "knife-fighting," and this was its practice in Germany itself. Bukharin said in another statement that fascism was setting itself up against the moderate bourgeois democracies and only in an alliance with them was it possible to deter fascist aggression. These same arguments—about the possibility and even inevitability of German aggression against the USSR, about the need for an antifascist alliance with the western bourgeois democracies—were advanced repeatedly by Uborevich and Tukhachevskiy, but the real power was in the hands of the first group—and it was that group that was determining foreign political activity.

[Question] But yet in the thirties all the steps were taken—quite significant ones—to create a system of collective security in Europe.

[Answer] Yes. In December 1933 the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee adopted a decree on organizing a struggle to create an effective system of collective security in Europe in order to

preserve the peace and deter aggression. In 1934 the USSR entered the League of Nations and over the 3 years that followed it concluded treaties on mutual assistance with France, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia and a nonaggression treaty with China.

But this sound line of foreign policy began to be pursued in the 1st half of the thirties, when the cult of Stalin's personality and the related command-administrative system of administration had just gathered force, when democracy and glasnost still existed to some extent in our country. Later, it changed—the course headed toward rapprochement with fascist Germany became stronger and stronger. This was, of course, served by the Munich deal in 1938, but the main role, of course, was played by Stalin's position toward fascism, which he openly proclaimed at the 17th party congress. This is what he declared at that time: "...We are far from being delighted with the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the point here, if only because fascism, in Italy, for example, has not stood in the way of the USSR's establishing the best relations with that country." Having become the ruler with all the power, Stalin implemented that principle through the foreign policy of the USSR.

[Question] There is another position which needs clarification. Speaking in a session of the Supreme Soviet on 31 May 1939, Molotov declared that the Soviet Government had accepted the proposal of England and France to open negotiations in order to strengthen relations among those three countries and to organize a peace front against further aggression. In other words—against Hitler Germany. English and French military missions arrived in Moscow on 11 August. But their leaders did not have the power to sign a treaty; the negotiations bogged down and were never able to get going, and in the end came to nothing. The question is this: Why did England and France, which perfectly understood the military danger from Germany, shirk from concluding an alliance with the USSR and in this way setting up a strong barrier to Hitler?

[Answer] The point is that the policy of the English and French Governments was not consistent on this question. They did not want to bind themselves with specific obligations.

[Question] The course of the negotiations was also influenced to no small degree by the fact that the period of repression had weakened our country. No state, after all, as is well-known, can risk concluding a treaty on joint actions—especially in war—with a partner known to be weakened.

There is also something else that needs to be borne in mind: The Stalinist leadership of the USSR felt that England and France would be too much for Hitler and did not try very hard to make an alliance with them, adopting a waiting position. Voroshilov once said in a conversation immediately after the war: "We still

thought that if Germany attacked England and France, it would become tied down there for a long time. Who would have thought that France would cave in in just 2 weeks!"

[Answer] On 20 August 1939, when the Soviet-Franco-English negotiations were already under way in Moscow, Hitler sent Stalin a telegram saying that in relations between Germany and Poland "a crisis" could "break out any day" in which the Soviet Union would also become involved if it did not immediately agree to conclude a nonaggression treaty with Germany. Hitler wrote: "Once again, then, I suggest that you receive my minister of foreign affairs on Tuesday, 22 August, and no later than Wednesday, 23 August. The imperial minister will be endowed with all extraordinary powers to draft and sign a nonaggression pact." This proposal, although it was written in the form of an ultimatum, fitted in with Stalin's intentions and to some degree was in line with his appraisal of fascism back at the 17th party congress. And even though the English and French representatives were still sitting in Moscow, the Soviet leadership received Ribbentrop, and the nonaggression treaty was signed. Khmelnitskiy, Voroshilov's aide, has told about Stalin summoning him and ordering him to convey to Voroshilov, who at that time was sitting in the negotiations with the English and French as the head of the Soviet delegation, to break off the negotiations. And R.P. Khmelnitskiy delivered a note to Voroshilov: "Klim! Koba says to turn off the hurdy-gurdy."

[Question] By all appearances it was from that moment that the change in Stalin's course in the direction of Germany became obvious. During Ribbentrop's visit he made the toast: "Since the German people so loves its fuehrer, we will drink to the fuehrer's health." And Molotov officially made this new line public when on 31 August he declared in a session of the Supreme Soviet: "Even yesterday the fascists of Germany were conducting a foreign policy toward the USSR that was hostile to us. Yes, even yesterday we were adversaries in the field of foreign affairs. But today the situation has changed, and we have ceased to be enemies." In a few hours the Germans invaded Poland.

[Answer] The intention at that time, in August, was that the western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia that were under the power of Poland were to go to the Soviet Union....

[Question] ...And that is what happened. On 17 September Molotov announced over the radio that the Polish state was "internally unsound" and that the "Soviet Government had issued an order to the supreme command of the Red Army to order forces to cross the border and take under their protection the life and property of the population of the western Ukraine and western Belorussia." The Red Army carried out the order and in a short time occupied extensive territories to the west of the border. The German forces were at that time advancing from west to east. And on 28 September a treaty on

friendship and on the border between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. As a matter of fact, as far as I know, literature on Soviet history has never mentioned this odious document.

[Answer] A number of other declarations were also made in that period. For instance, on 17 September the USSR declared neutrality in the war, and on 19 September a Soviet-German communique was published which stated that Soviet and German forces had been set the task of "restoring peace and order and the disrupted consequences of the collapse of the Polish state." We declare neutrality and immediately, in literally 2 days, we declare ourselves to be allies of fascist Germany toward defeated Poland for the purpose of restoring order there! And on 31 August Molotov, speaking in a session of the Supreme Soviet to justify the need of the treaty on friendship and the border, offered an utterly different description of German fascism than before.

[Question] I will take the liberty of quoting. First, Molotov said that "it took only a brief strike against Poland first from the German Army and then the Red Army to obliterate that deformed offspring of the Versailles Treaty." And then he said in this appalling statement: "The ideology of Hitlerism...can be recognized or denied.... But everyone will realize that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force.... It is not only senseless, then, but even criminal to wage such a war as a war to 'destroy Hitlerism,' concealed under the false flag of a struggle for 'democracy.'" As a matter of fact, it was in that same speech that Molotov radically shifted what had been the political emphasis, when he said: "Now...Germany is in the position of the state that is striving for peace, and England and France...are opposed to the conclusion of peace." Thus the aggressor turned out not to be Hitler, but England and France...."

[Answer] The declaration of the Soviet and German Governments was published as early as 29 September in connection with the signing of the treaty on friendship and the border. It contained an appeal to terminate the war between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other. "If, however," it stated, "these efforts prove unsuccessful, this will establish the fact that England and France bear responsibility for perpetuating the war, and should the war continue, the governments of Germany and the USSR will consult with one another on the steps which are necessary." And before his departure from Moscow Ribbentrop declared to a TASS correspondent that if in England and France "those who are inciting war win out, then Germany and the USSR will know how to respond."

[Question] From which it follows: Stalin did not exclude the possibility of entering the war on Hitler's side?

[Answer] No one knows. But I do not think that Stalin intended to go that far. It is one thing to draw closer to Germany in the interests of carrying out one's policy, and something quite different to conclude a military

alliance with fascism. He was aware that such an alliance would be impossible for him for political reasons and reasons of ideology and military strategy.

[Question] But nothing prevented Stalin from declaring: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, strengthened in blood, has every basis for being prolonged and firm." And what about Hitler? How sincerely did he take this brotherhood?

[Answer] Stalin expressed it in his own style: saying something other than what he was thinking. Having become in effect a dictator, in the field of foreign policy Stalin was guided not so much by scientific assessments as by the desire to subordinate the development of international processes to his own will, "playing" on the contradictions of imperialism. This can explain the USSR's rapprochement with fascist Germany at the end of the thirties, which glaringly contradicted the Soviet policy of setting up a system of collective security in Europe. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov said of Stalin's policy that "at the beginning he (Stalin—V.K.) was convinced that it was he who would twist Hitler around his little finger by concluding the pact. But then it all turned out just the other way around."

On 23 November 1939 Hitler made a speech to the leaders of the Wehrmacht in which he described our country as a state weakened by internal processes and did not represent a serious military threat to Germany. He placed the nonaggression treaty with the USSR in the class of "precautionary" treaties which in his opinion would be observed by the parties to it only so long as it was expedient. "The fact remains," he said, "that Russian armed forces have low combat readiness at the present time. The present situation will persist over the next 1 or 2 years." Hitler then added: "We will be able to move against Russia only after we free ourselves in the west." Nevertheless, the "precautionary" treaty did help fascist Germany substantially in avoiding the "nightmare" of a war on two fronts in the period 1939-1941. In 1940 Hitler committed his main forces—about 136 divisions—against England, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, while he left 4 infantry divisions and 6 rear defense divisions on the border with the Soviet Union. In 1941 he threw his main forces against the Soviet Union, leaving only occupation forces in western Europe.

So, if we add up the subtotal, we can say that the foreign policy of the Stalinist leadership in the latter half of the thirties did not perform its main task—to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. What is more, it allowed Germany to perform its own "tasks" in Europe as speedily as possible and to prepare for the attack on the Soviet Union.

[Question] But how about the argument that Stalin's foreign policy, in particular the signing of the nonaggression treaty, helped to put off Germany's attack by 1.5 years?

[Answer] That postponement did not occur because of the treaty. The German leadership was carrying out its plan of war in Europe: first to crush Poland, occupy or bring into its coalition the states of northern and south-eastern Europe, to deal with France and, if possible, England, to "free itself" in the west, and to strengthen the alliance with Italy and Japan. It was that that required the 1.5 years. It would have been risky to undertake an attack on the USSR in the fall of 1939, when Germany had about 110 divisions, more than 43 of which were deployed in the west, even though Hitler did consider the Soviet Union to be weakened. German armed forces were deployed in Europe in the course of the war. By the beginning of the war against the USSR the German Army numbered 208 divisions, 152 of which were thrown against our country. Judge for yourself who benefited from that "postponement."

[Question] It is well-known that Stalin had been warned about the attack being prepared and that specific dates had been named. Even Count Schulenburg, German ambassador in the USSR, had openly said that war would soon begin. Could Stalin not have believed this?

[Answer] Stalin had quite detailed information even about fascist Germany's preparation of the attack on the USSR and also about the dates when it would begin, and indeed even about the forces used in the aggression. At the same time, he seems to have deliberately shut his eyes to the realities, saying that Hitler would not commit a violation of the treaty. Stalin actually said that our intelligence agents could not be believed, and in a short time—between 1936 and 1940—five chiefs of the Chief Intelligence Administration of the General Staff were victims of the repression.

But while he did not wish to listen to his friends, Stalin allowed himself to be lulled to sleep by his enemies. In 1941 he sent Hitler a confidential letter in which he raised the issue of Germany's preparations for war close to our borders. Hitler responded by giving his word as reichskanzler that his country was not preparing an attack on the USSR. Hitler explained the fact that forces had been brought to eastern Europe close to the borders of the USSR in terms of the need to prepare them for the invasion of England where they would be inaccessible to the English Air Force. And these amounted to 130 divisions! This was a lullaby for Iosif Vissarionovich....

While apparently understanding this in the depth of his soul, Stalin did everything not to provoke an attack in any way, so that Hitler would not suspect him of a desire to break the treaty. The reorganization and reequipping of our armed forces, which were actively undertaken in 1940, were not completed because of red tape, poor organization, the bureaucratic methods of administration, industry was performing poorly, and it was not producing weapons in the quantities needed. What is more, there was no military doctrine to speak of. The one that had been formulated in the twenties had actually not been reviewed. The only propositions that were

advanced were that we would wage war on foreign territory, and with little bloodshed we would turn it into a civil war in which the world proletariat would fight the world bourgeoisie.

Because we had prepared to fight on foreign territory, more than half of our stocks—weapons, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, and fuel, were stored close to the border. And in the 1st week of the war 25,000 freight cars (30 percent of all the stocks) of ammunition, 50 percent of all the stocks of fuel and food and animal feed had already been either destroyed or taken by the enemy. These were the vivid consequences of the shortsighted policy.

Fearing to provoke Germany's attack, Stalin took steps which are difficult to explain. For instance, not long before the fascist aggression official permission was granted the Germans at their request to "study the graves" of German soldiers who died in World War I and were buried on our territory. And so along all the routes—from the Baltic Sea and almost to the Black Sea—groups of German intelligence agents walked in the rear of our armed forces supposedly "studying the graves." A second fact. The German Air Force had freely violated our airspace and had penetrated the depth of Soviet territory to great distances and was actively gathering intelligence, and our PVO forces were categorically forbidden to bring down these intelligence planes. What is more, when the German airplanes were forced to land at our airports because of engine failure, they were repaired and fueled and sent back home in peace. Until the very last moment—at 0300 hours on the morning of 22 June 1941—our freight trains carrying grain, ore, and so on, under the treaty, were regularly dispatched to Germany, even though Germany ceased the return deliveries to us, especially of machines and machine tools, back at the beginning of 1941. The Germans showed our acceptance people finished machine tools, and they accepted them, but these machine tools never reached us.

[Question] But we have already gotten up to the summer of 1941, and our interview was supposed to be about the prewar period. That is why I would like to go back to 1940 and recall once again an immoral understanding between Stalin and Hitler—the agreement to repatriate Germans from the USSR. Under it many Germans who were patriots and party members were turned over to Germany. Here is a case recounted to me recently by one of our historians—V.I. Dashichev. In 1937 Neuman, a member of the Politburo of the German Communist Party, the second man in the GCP after Ernst Telman, came to the USSR with his wife. Immediately after he arrived in Moscow he disappeared without a trace and was obviously shot, but his wife was thrown in a camp in the area around Vorkuta. In 1940, under the agreement on repatriation, this woman was sent back to Germany along with other German party members and went straight from a Soviet camp to the Ravensbrück concentration camp. As a matter of fact, many Bulgarian, Polish, and Hungarian party members either went to prison or were shot when they arrived in the USSR....

[Answer] Yes, many Communists who belonged to the leadership of the communist parties and who were in Moscow, in the Comintern, were victims of the repression. For example, the Polish Communist Party was dissolved completely without any basis as being "revisionist." Many people were killed. It is true that Georgiy Dimitrov did not fall victim to the repression, but even he was completely isolated during the war. Even when Soviet forces were preparing to enter the territory of Bulgaria in 1944, he was not promptly informed, even though he was general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The total number of victims of the repression are beyond counting—they were not just one or two, these were tens, hundreds, and thousands of people. That was the fate, for example, of Bela Kun; and Krestinskiy, one of the founders of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was shot.

Another unforgivable error of Stalin was his line of doctrine that the Social Democrats were the main adversary of Communists.

[Question] I would like to recall in this connection a letter published in the third issue of the magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV from the well-known Soviet journalist Ernst Genri to the writer Ilya Erenburg. Recalling that back in 1924 Stalin had called for "mortal combat against social democracy," E. Genri wrote: "Stalin's words were the same as an order to the Comintern, just like his instructions to the Red Army or the NKVD. They split off the workers from one another like a barricade.... The old social democrat workers were everywhere not only humiliated to the depth of their soul, they were infuriated. They have not forgiven the Communists for this. And the Communists, clenching their teeth, carried out the order about "mortal combat."... Everywhere, as though they had lost their minds, the Social Democrats and Communists raged against one another before the very eyes of the fascists. I...will never forget how the old comrades clenched their fists...how the theory of social fascism laid the road to Hitler month by month, week by week.... Stalin renounced the theory of social fascism only in 1935, but it was already too late.... Having strengthened his rear in Germany and throughout western Europe, and observing with malicious satisfaction that the antifascists were at one another's throats, Hitler was able to begin the war. And he did begin it. His front and rear were strengthened by the policy of the 'Soviet Machiavelli.' Instead of uniting them and bringing them together on the eve of the decisive historical battle, Stalin drove them apart, fragmented them, and frightened them away."

Tell me, Vasily Mikhaylovich, how is all this to be explained? After all, one gets the impression that Stalin deliberately destroyed and undermined the country—its economy, science, culture, and security. He even went as far as the international communist movement and discredited the very ideals of communism!

[Answer] This is altogether inexplicable to a normal man.

It would have seemed that Stalin had to do everything to strengthen our state and its security. And verbally everything actually was splendid. But in practice everything was done the other way about. How to explain all this? There is no way it can be explained from the point of view of common sense. But if we still look for some explanation, then I think it lies in the usurpation of power, in the maniacal desire to preserve his own exclusive power, the absence of control and criticism of the activity of the highest party and Soviet leadership.

[Question] And the last question. Historians, writers, and journalists are now being quite often addressed reproaches like this: they are engaging in slander, they are canceling all of our past so that not a single bright spot seems to be left in our history. What is your attitude toward such a position?

[Answer] The researcher's task is to examine the process the way it was, not as he would like to see it, and not to be concerned with judging whether there is more positive or more negative and comparing them to make it look better. Research must not be apologetic, it must be truthful. In doing that we are not insulting those people who died and fought on the front and who worked heroically in the rear. It was they in fact who rescued the country, they shielded it with their own bodies.

07045

**Supreme Soviet Decree on Kuznetsov
Rehabilitation**

18010123 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
27 Jul 88 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Rehabilitation of Vice Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov to his former military rank of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union"]

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolves:

To rehabilitate Vice Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetov to his former military rank of **Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union**. [signed] **Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR**

A. GROMYKO.

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

T. MENTESHASHVILI.

Moscow, the Kremlin.

26 July 1988 UD/336

Analysis of European Defense Policy Since INF
Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in
English No 5, May 88 pp 69-73

[Article by Vladimir Stupishin entitled: "Indeed, Nothing in Europe is Simple."] [Excerpts] It is encouraging to know that new voices are now heard in the INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS journal and a serious discussion on problems of Soviet foreign policy is beginning. This did not happen before. And not only in this journal. For the second year now complaints are heard that journalists specializing in international politics lag behind their colleagues covering domestic affairs. Nonetheless, no progress has been made here with rare exceptions, as for instance, commentary by Aleksandr Bovin. Even Vladimir Tsvetov, who was the first to criticize our foreign-policy journalism, is still waiting for "reliable backing" in the form of "full and objective analysis of the past of our foreign policy", so that we may "readily plunge into the inferno" (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, February 16 1988). ...

[Paragraph omitted]

I think INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS has set a good example of precisely such journalism, having published in its March issue this year the article "Nothing is simple in Europe" by Sergei Vybornov, Andrei Gusenkov and Vladimir Leontiev. The three young diplomats boldly express their considerations on a number of major international issues, not waiting for official approval of their ideas. And the Foreign Ministry building in Smolenskaya Square did not tumble down because of that! It is quite possible that something of what they have proposed may become an official stance. Why not? ...

[Passage omitted]

So let us begin from the beginning, or almost the beginning, from the main thesis expressed in so many words: "U.S. monopoly on engaging in dialogue with the USSR consolidates American leadership in the West, leaving Europe a secondary role in world politics." In the opinion of the authors of the article, "we largely facilitated this ourselves", as we did not notice, or failed to take into account, that the West European imperialist centre of strength had grown more active. ...

[Passage omitted]

... Now that "Eurostrategic" and shorter-range missiles of the USSR and the USA are being removed, and their strategic offensive arms are to be subsequently reduced, the relative weight of the French and British potentials will inevitably be growing, while their functions show already now a tendency to self-expansion, about which the young diplomats speak convincingly and timely in their article.

They have good reason to stress that the potential of all nuclear powers must be taken into account, especially those of France and Britain which are still building up

their nuclear-missile might and regard the idea of a nuclear-free world sceptically, to say the least. The authors have proved that these potentials should be taken into account also with regard to nuclear arms reductions down to a "sub-zero" level. But as they advocate this idea, which is, in my opinion, indisputable, they go too far in criticizing the well-known study published by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War, in which a formula of a "sub-zero" nuclear balance is proposed, and accuse the authors of this formula of excluding "too easily" the nuclear armaments of France and Britain from the strategic balance and of allegedly "taking it for granted that the nuclear potentials of these two countries would disappear before the Soviet and American potentials are liquidated; or that before the latter takes place, the former would be reduced in a proportionate way". But there is nothing of the kind, or almost nothing in the formula proposed by the Committee of Soviet Scientists. Thus considering the variants of 75% reductions of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA the scientists clearly proceed from the fact that such reductions "will be impossible either from a political or military point of view, unless other nuclear powers join the nuclear disarmament project by that time."¹ But in the case of 95 per cent reductions they will amount to 5 per cent only for the USSR and the USA, as if France and Britain, and, perhaps, some other countries have agreed beforehand to renounce their nuclear status by that time. This hypothesis is unreal and therefore useless. And the young diplomats are absolutely right to say that all this is not self-evident. But the scientists themselves suggest as an alternative a "proportionate" reduction of the nuclear forces of "third countries", and not only their complete elimination. However, this alternative is not formulated intelligibly enough, which gave the authors grounds for criticizing the corresponding place in the adapted version of the "sub-zero" balance formula.

But this is not the main point. The main point is that our authors did not limit themselves to criticizing some shortcomings, but took the bull by the horns and called in question something very essential: the choice of a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as the material basis for the formula of "sub-zero" strategic nuclear balance. Specialists will have their say later, but I think the authors' reasoning is logical, convincing and constructive. Having proved the vulnerability of stability based on mobile ICBMs, our critics advanced their own version of a material basis of the "sub-zero" balance, which in essence means that the strategic nuclear arsenals in the "sub-zero" phase should be reduced to a limited number of missile-carrying submarines, that definite patrol regions be established, anti-submarine activities in the patrol regions of other sides be stopped, verification measures be agreed upon, etc. A beautiful model, indeed. Why shouldn't it become a nucleus of a system of reasonable sufficiency in the "sub-zero" phase of disarmament?!

Analysing the significance of the nuclear potentials of France and Britain, especially in the "Eurostrategic" equation, the authors inevitably concerned themselves with such an important element of this equation as West European military integration, which is far from being completely carried out, but which has already gone through the stage of intergovernmental military cooperation. They noticed, just in time, not only that the processes of military integration have become more active, but also that they have entered a new phase whose main feature is that a turn toward military integration has already taken place in public opinion. The facts cited in the article, which show that the sentiments in the French parliament are changing, could be complemented with the results of opinion polls indicating that about 90 per cent of the French regard positively not just activation of military integration "in some form", but the prospect of creating a single army of the European Community countries.²

The data show that this is precisely what young people in France think are most significant. It is really "safe to say therefore that the course for building a 'military Europe' will remain constant in French foreign policy in the near future, no matter what party or coalition of parties is in power". The conclusion is significant and the forecast is well grounded.

However, the phrase "France has clearly had a hand in this" with regard to "military development in Europe" sounds inaccurate and unconvincing. Indeed, this development is gaining momentum not simply with the participation of France, but primarily at its initiative, which is so great that the West European politicians begin to talk about Franco-centrism (sic). They have good reason to assert this, since the arrival of the military articles of the 1963 Elysee Treaty with the FRG, the stepped-up military cooperation with Britain, Italy and Spain, the reanimation of the Western European Union (WEU), the platform for European Security Interests adopted in the Hague—all these and other integrational processes in Western Europe have been inspired and organised mainly by Paris which clearly is looking for a "European" political justification of its policy of perpetuating "nuclear deterrence".

Joint manufacture of weapons is an important element of military integration tendencies. Here, too, France is obviously in the lead. The military-industrial concerns of France, Britain, the FRG, Italy and other WEU countries have joined the American SDI programmes, are busy developing independently their own European ABM systems, seek ways of establishing cooperation among themselves, are using the military aspects of the Eureka programme, and are exploring the possibility of a military "Eureka". In all these undertakings Paris has no mean role to play, but I doubt the correctness of the statement that the Americans allegedly had to talk the French out of signing an inter-governmental agreement on taking part in SDI, because, should Paris offer the USA such a cover-up in terms of international law for

Star Wars, Washington would certainly not reject it, and it had to reconcile itself with France's freedom of manoeuvre, since France joined SDI de facto, on the level of its military-industrial concerns.

Incidentally, the independent European Programme Group dealing with conventional arms allegedly outside the NATO framework is also a product of French diplomacy. Paris urges the adoption of the idea of military integration in the system of the European Community which in the future will be transformed into a European Union and at the first stage will be a confederation with supra-national policy and defence and then, perhaps, a superpower, something like a United States of Europe. This is the mood spreading among the younger generation in the countries of the European Community.

The economic basis of military integration is, of course, not specialisation and cooperation of military-industrial enterprises, but the process of economic integration as a whole which is gradually extending to the military industry. In political terms, the point is that it is not a matter of a "compact and organised group of West European countries" taking shape that is significant, as the article says, but of the fact that it has already taken shape and functions as a political entity called the European Community, and not "within the NATO framework", but juridically outside NATO, though it is composed of NATO member countries. Will it become a "European buttress" of NATO and as such a "mechanism of toughening 'discipline' among some members of the bloc in American interests and a means of distributing roles between the USA and Western Europe", or will it become "a means of influencing the USA, an organisation for expressing special interests of West Europeans"?

From the point of view of common interests of Europe, and not only Western Europe, but the whole of Europe, it is important to know the answer to this question: will Europe benefit from the integration of one of its parts?

The answer, in my view, is this: the growth of military integration in Western Europe and creation of some new organisational forms of a "European buttress" of NATO may provide Western Europe with yet another instrument for influencing the USA. But a far more essential and really negative result of this will be that the split of Europe into opposed blocs will be consolidated and new obstacles will be put in the general European process and the construction of a common European home will be impeded, to the detriment of our interests as well. This is why we are so concerned over the military-integration tendencies in Western Europe. They are of concern to us also because open and secret plans for continuing the modernisation of weapons and the arms race and the perpetuation of nuclear deterrence may be a result of these tendencies. ...

[Passage omitted].

Footnotes

1. Strategicheskaya stabil'nost' v usloviyakh radikal'nykh sokreshcheniy yadernykh vooruzheniy (adaptirovanny variant), Moscow, 1987, pp 26-27.

2. Le Monde, June 25, 1987; L'Express, Apr. 17, 1987.

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Lithuanian SSR Afghanistan Casualties Noted

18090001 [Editorial Report] Vilnius TIESA 6 August 1988 on page 4 carried an 800-word interview with the chief of the Lithuanian SSR Military Commissariat Political Department, Konstantin Golubev, entitled "Soldiers From Afghanistan Are Returning Home." In the interview Golubev remarks that in the republic, news of the soldiers' return from Afghanistan was met with undisguised joy. "Those of us who work at the military commissariat saw as no others did the anxiety of parents for their sons who were called up for military service." When asked to respond on the number of young men from Lithuania who had undergone the school of severe experience in Afghanistan and what their fate was, Golubev answered: "More than 2000 participated in battles against the enemies of the present Afghanistan government and returned home, more than 300 of them returned honored with state awards, medals and orders of the USSR. Families experienced with great pain the loss of 81 of their sons, 91 were wounded and 36 became

invalids. 'Afghaners' reside in almost every republic town and rayon. Their fates are different. From the first day, most of them plunged into public life, where they pass on their experience to others who will have to join the ranks of the military. In the republic, 22 of the returnees have gone to the military reserves, in which former soldiers internationalists are playing a dominant role."

The rest of the interview dealt with the problems of adjusting to life back in the rayons and kolkhozes, and, for the most part, the issue of benefits for the veterans and the difficulty of obtaining housing. When the interviewer stated that parents and relatives are worried as to whether those called up for military service will have to serve in Afghanistan, Golubev answered: "As you know the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the republic of Afghanistan is taking place. The withdrawal should be completed by 1989."

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